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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) used its
Chapter VII powers under the United Nations Charter to authorize "all
necessary measures" to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya.'
Notably, the resolution was careful to cabin its instructions to the use of
preventive measures to protect civilians from harm, opting not to authorize the
use of force against the state of Libya or even the Qaddafi regime. When, in
January 2012, the European Union (EU) approved an unprecedented package
of sanctions against Iran, European leaders were careful to note, "[w]e have no
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York Law School, Boalt Hall School of Law, and Harvard Law School, for helpful comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts. I am indebted to NYU Tikvah Center, where I was a Berkowitz Fellow,
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1. S.C. Res. 1973, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, at 3 (Mar. 17, 2011).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
quarrel with the Iranian people," but then added, "[u]ntil Iran comes to the
table, we will be united behind strong measures .. . to demonstrate the cost of a
path that threatens the peace and security of us all." 2 While this may seem
obvious today, justifying international coercive measures against states in terms
of prevention of threats, rather than as punishment for transgressions, was by
no means inevitable.
Until not very long ago, international law used the language of
reprehension and blame, referring to state action in violation of international
law as a "crime" warranting retributive "punishment."3 Since World War I,
however, the moral rhetoric of state "crime and punishment" has been excised
from the lexicon of international law. Any notion of "guilt" belonging to the
state has been replaced with the more benign conceptions of "responsibility"
and "threat." Correspondingly, coercive action against states can no longer be
justified by any punitive urge but instead must be couched in terms of
regulatory or preventive action.
Thus, the use of military force-at one point, the ultimate measure of
punitive justice for an injury suffered by a sovereign-is now permitted only in
individual or collective self-defense or under a UNSC Resolution in response to
a "threat to international peace and security." No conduct in war may be
justified by the urge to "punish the enemy." Sanctions imposed by the UNSC
against rogue countries are never labeled "punishment"; they are seen instead
as preventive acts or regulatory action. In 2001, the U.N. International Law
Commission, author of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for
International Obligations, renamed the Chapter once entitled "international
crimes" as "serious breaches of essential obligations to the international
community" and eliminated punitive damages as a form of permissible
reparation altogether.4
As an alternative to state punishment, international law has channeled all
punitive sanctions to individuals. Indeed, before even authorizing
"preventative" use of force in Libya, the UNSC referred the situation in Libya
to the International Criminal Court for the indictment of Qaddafi, and placed
travel restrictions on other high level officials in the Qaddafi regime.5 Under
2. Press Statement, United Kingdom, Germany & France, PM, Chancellor Merkel and
President Sarkozy Statement on Iran Sanctions (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.numberl0.gov.uk/news/iran
-sanctions [hereinafter Statement on Iran Sanctions].
3. For the purposes of this Article, I consider the term "punishment" to denote a sanction
imposed on an actor as a result of moral condemnation of prior prohibited conduct by that actor. For a
classic treatment of this definition, see Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958). Of course, the just aims of punishment have been heatedly debated
for centuries. I do not engage this debate here, but I do assume retribution to be a legitimate aim of
punishment. For a concise overview of the debate, as well as a defense of the retributive model, see
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited, 80 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. Ass'N
45,46-49 (2006).
4. See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, at
245-46, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (explaining that compensation is
not intended to "punish the responsible State, nor does compensation have an expressive or exemplary
character"); Summary Records of the Meetings of the 52nd Session, [2000] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
392, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2000.
5. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
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present international law, only individuals can "commit crimes" and be subject
to criminal accountability in domestic and international tribunals. This is the
case even though most international crimes committed by individuals could not
have been committed outside the framework of a state or collective action.
All of this is true as a theoretical matter. In practice, of course, many
coercive measures against states cannot but be viewed, at least in part, as a
form of punishment. Examples range from U.S. engagement in armed reprisals
against Libya (1986) and Sudan (1998), to the UNSC's economic sanctions on
Iraq following the expulsion of weapons inspectors (1998), or on North Korea
following a nuclear ballistic test (2009), to the Israeli blockade on Gaza since
the Hamas takeover (2006). In fact, statements by individual political leaders,
media accounts, and scholars have often identified a punitive drive as a
motivation for coercive action.6 Following the EU's announcement of its
sanctions on Iran, The Christian Science Monitor was quick to observe that
these sanctions were "aimed at seriously punishing Iran over questions about
the nature of its nuclear program, delaying military action, and, however likely
or unlikely, spurring talks." 7
If so, a more accurate portrayal of the international trend may be not that
present-day international law does not permit the punishment of states, but that
it does not permit admitting to it within the legal context. Accordingly, this
Article seeks to explore two questions. First, why does international law stick
to the disguise of value-neutral "prevention," when in practice, it still actually
intends to assign blame and engage in retribution-the two elemental
components of punitive action? Second, does this rhetorical disguise of
punishment-as-prevention have any practical effects, and if so, what might they
be? Ultimately, this inquiry should lead us to consider the implications of
relying on conceptual-rhetorical frameworks for international relations more
broadly.
A prolific international law and international relations literature has
already grappled with the question of why international law should have moved
away from state punishment. Ontological inquiries have doubted whether a
"state," an abstract entity, can commit crimes, suggesting that state criminality
is a misguided personification that draws on tortured analogies from the
conduct of human beings.9 Conceptual discussions have centered on the
6. See, e.g., NINA H.B. JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES 167-86 (2000).
7. Robert Marquand, Iran Oil Embargo: How Tough Are the EU Sanctions?, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Jan. 24, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0124/Iran-oil-embargo-how
-tough-are-the-EU-sanctions.
8. See JORGENSEN, supra note 6, at 167-68 (arguing that despite formal distinctions between
"punishment," "sanctions," "countermeasures," and "measures," which may be exercised by the United
Nations, or by states acting individually or collectively, there seems to be broad agreement in the
existing literature that states can, and in fact do, commit crimes, and that the notion of "punishing states"
should be recognized and addressed).
9. Harry D. Gould, International Criminal Bodies: Conceptual Clarification ofthe Ideas of
State Criminality and International Punishment, 35 REV. INT'L STUD. 701 (2009) (rejecting the notion
of state criminality on ontological grounds); see also HARRY D. GOULD, THE LEGACY OF PUNISHMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 109-35 (2010) (arguing that it is "untenable to treat [states'] legal and
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incongruence of a concept of punishment in a system of equally sovereign
states and asked by what standards "crimes" are distinguishable from other
types of offenses.' 0 Pragmatic debates have addressed what forms the
punishment of states might take, especially considering its collective adverse
effects on the state's nationals, as well as what institutional framework could be
employed to mete out such punishment."
This Article suggests that these various explanations, while each having
some bite, are but mere elements of a broader agenda driving the flight from
state crime and punishment-namely, a strong overarching preference for
peace and stability over justice in interstate relations.12 Rather than discrete
ontological, conceptual, or pragmatic considerations, what has been driving the
changes in international law is the belief that a seemingly value-neutral
prevention paradigm is more conducive to peaceful coexistence than the moral-
laden concepts of punishment and retribution.
To support this claim, the Article first offers a historical account of the
shift from the language of "guilt" and "punishment" to the language of "threat"
and "prevention" in four areas of international law: the use of force (jus ad
bellum), the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello), the imposition of non-military
sanctions, and the international rules on state responsibility. While existing
literature has already noted the shift away from punishment in each of these
fields separately,'1 I demonstrate how they all fit within a broader trend of
disguising punishment and retribution within a conceptual framework of
"prevention."
The historical account suggests that, far being from accidental, or a mere
rhetorical or stylistic move, the flight from state crime and punishment has
been a deliberate choice, linking a preference for peace with a preference for
prevention. Yet why such a negative correlation should be made between peace
and punishment is not self-evident. Drawing on the historical account, the
Article then gleans four possible justifications for this negative correlation:
(1) the fear that punishment may invite revenge and further violence; (2) an
aversion to collective punishment; (3) the principle of sovereign equality as an
organizing principle of the international system; and (4) the absence of
international mechanisms to enforce a rule of international law. All four
moral personality as anything other than metaphorical"); FARHAD MALEKIAN, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES: A STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 177-78
(1985); Quincy Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 514, 528 (1956) (noting that
the "idea of a criminal state has in fact largely disappeared"). But see Anthony F. Lang Jr., Crime and
Punishment: Holding States Accountable, 21 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 239, 242-45 (2007) (disputing
the argument that abstract entities cannot commit crimes); David Luban, War as Punishment, 39 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 299 (2012) (discussing whether punishment could constitute just cause for war); Alain Pellet,
Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 425, 432 (1999) (claiming that states
can and should be punished under some circumstances).
10. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 9, at 718.
11. Anthony F. Lang Jr., Punitive Justifications or Just Punishment? An Ethical Reading of
Coercive Diplomacy, 19 CAMB. REV. INT. AFF. 389-403 (2006).
12. Whether the international community prefers peace over justice in the context of
individual criminal responsibility is a separate question, which much scholarly literature has addressed.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
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justifications have some bite. And yet, when tested against the existing
international practice of "prevention," none is sufficient in and of itself to
justify the emerging aversion to retributive punishment in the name of peace.
In its final part, the Article moves beyond the analytical account to the
normative: I suggest that even if we were to accept a general preference for
peace over justice, there is little reason to believe that the elimination of state
punishment and the focus on prevention best serves this preference.
To support this claim, I borrow from a similar tendency in recent decades
toward prevention in U.S. domestic criminal law. The rise of the "preventive
state"l 4 and the use of penal sanctions for ostensibly preventive purposes have
been a cause for serious concern among scholars and practitioners, including
the dangers of overuse, perverse sentencing, and lack of due process
guarantees.' 5 These concerns, I argue, might lend themselves, mutatis
mutandis, to the international sphere. While the analogy is at best imperfect,
and its empirical examination difficult, it is nonetheless sufficiently plausible to
suggest another angle from which to assess the fading conception of state crime
and punishment.
The main conclusion from bridging the domestic and international is that
there is little reason to believe that the insistence on a preventive rhetoric
necessarily allows for less international violence than would a guilt-based
rhetoric; it only allows for violence under different circumstances or, even
more accurately, under different rhetorical justifications. Overall, it may be that
both paradigms are sufficiently malleable in their application to justify coercion
under similar conditions, with only the rhetorical justification to distinguish
them from each other. If so, the rhetorical shift may be of no consequence.
But it may also be, as domestic criminal law scholars have observed, that
even though prevention may sound like a less oppressive policy than
punishment, it may in fact be far less constrained and more ruthless. It may also
be open-ended, unbounded by principles of proportionality. Worse yet, the
absence of a paradigm of crime and punishment obscures any normative
judgment of the act in question; the "international community" does not stand
against the deviant state as its accuser, only as a regulator. At the same time, by
demanding a show of threat to others, a preventive paradigm might be
paralyzed from operating where there is a crime that does not immediately
threaten other international actors. In other words, once the focus of the
sanction is on "threat" rather than on "guilt," a preventive paradigm might
sometimes allow for and invite more violence than would a punitive one, but
might also suppress violence where it is otherwise warranted. To demonstrate
both these possibilities, I invoke the contemporary debates over anticipatory
self-defense and humanitarian intervention.
14. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 1 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998) [hereinafter Steiker, Limits].
15. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence ofDangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1
(2003); Steiker, Limits, supra note 14; Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory
and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997) [hereinafter Steiker, Punishment].
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It is not my intention to make an ultimate prescriptive claim about the
desirability of punishing states under international law. Making such a claim
would require an elaboration of arguments which I merely note but do not
develop here, and which are not the primary purpose of this project. The
purpose, rather, is to demonstrate the historical trend of suppressing the concept
of punishment in interstate relationships, to reexamine its analytical premises,
and to suggest some under-appreciated possible consequences of it.
More broadly, the Article seeks to invite further inquiry into the
normative and pragmatic foundations of international law's present preference
for peace over justice as far as states are concerned. While this Article's focus
is on the supposed correlation between peace and a paradigm of prevention, it
suggests a reexamination of the tradeoff, real or imagined, between punishment
as a mechanism of upholding the rule of international law and the prevention of
interstate conflict. While the "peace versus justice" debate has long been raging
in discussions of transitional justice and individual punishment under
international criminal law,16 it has had far less resonance in discussions of state
crime and punishment.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II outlines the historical shift
from moral "guilt" to amoral "threat" in four areas of international law,
demonstrating the difficulty in drawing a practical line between acts of
punishment and acts of prevention. In so doing, the section suggests that the
historical shift has been driven by a preference for peace over justice. Part III
both considers and questions the possible justifications for the correlation
between prevention and peace. When tested against the prevention paradigm,
these justifications lose much of their force. Part IV borrows from domestic
criminal law to suggest possible distortions the doctrine of prevention may
have in international relations. To do so, it presents two contemporary debates
over international coercion, namely anticipatory self-defense and humanitarian
intervention. Part V concludes.
II. FROM PUNISHMENT TO PREVENTION: A SHORT HISTORY
This section seeks to demonstrate how the acknowledged prominence of
"guilt" has declined, replaced by references to "threats" as the formal
justification for sanctions or coercive conduct. The historical survey offered
here is by no means definitive or exhaustive; parts of it are also debatable.'7 It
is intended only to demonstrate the efforts within the legal context of
eliminating the concept of punishment and disguising retribution as prevention,
16. As far as individuals are concerned, the debates over the tension between peace and justice
in international criminal law are prolific. See, e.g., Mirjan Damagka, The Henry Morris Lecture: What is
the Point of International Criminal Justice? 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 329 (2008); Tom Ginsburg, The
Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 499 (2009).
17. A historical account of the shift from the former to the latter is complicated by the
difficulty in drawing a clear line between retribution and prevention. The same indistinctness also
explains how an ongoing practice of punishment can effectively hide behind the rhetoric of prevention.
It is also, of course, possible to view "guilt" and "threat" as points on a continuum, or as existing side by
side, so that an emphasis on one does not necessarily exclude the other. Nevertheless, this Article seeks
to draw out the general trend away from the former, and toward the latter.
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all in the name of greater peace and security. It is also intended to demonstrate
how state leaders and prominent scholars outside the legal context continue to
use the language of punishment, at times resisting and at times succumbing to
the legal structure's clear preference for prevention.
A. War-as-Punishment: Jus ad Bellum
Although the outlawing of wars of aggression is a twentieth-century
development, some regulation of the right to resort to war existed in many
recorded ancient, classical, and pre-modern societies. War was always
legitimate in defense against an aggressor. Its legitimacy also included a
restitutionary logic of self-help to regain people or property wrongfully
captured, to collect a debt, or to force a wrongdoing sovereign to make
compensatory reparations.19 Until recently, war also had a retributive face to it,
of just punishment for wrongdoing. However, as this section will demonstrate,
beginning after World War I the international community turned away from
this notion of war as justice, choosing instead to adopt a paradigm that allows
defensive wars only, emphasizing peace and stability.
To trace the history of the role of punishment in the justification for war it
is best to start off with the Christian Just War tradition, which dominated
Western legal thought from the fourth century onwards and which is very much
at the basis of the modern international law of jus ad bellum.20 Earning his
place as the most influential among the early Christian writers on the just cause
of war,21 St. Augustine held that war was a sin if it was waged with "[t]he
desire for harming, the cruelty of revenge, the restless and implacable mind, the
savagery of revolting, the lust for dominating and similar things."22 However,
"often, so that such things might also be justly punished, certain wars that must
be waged against the violence of those resisting are commanded by God or
some other legitimate ruler and are undertaken by the good."23 Writing in the
fifth century, Augustine's consideration of war was theological rather than
legal. His account of war was meant to reconcile the strategic necessities of the
18. Naturally, not all instances of international coercion are either threat-based or guilt-based;
some are merely exercises in arm-flexing, intended to induce states to act in a way favorable to the
coercer. I bracket out these types of coercive measures, and focus only on those where the justification
for coercive action relies on a legal claim, within the accepted international order.
19. On the evolution of the use of force in these contexts, see MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE
PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION: CHANGING BELIEFS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE (2004). See also Luban,
supra note 9; Joachim van Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33
AM. J. INT'L L. 665, 667 (1939).
20. For a discussion on overlaps between Christian and Muslim conceptions of just war,
including those of Averroes, see Mohamed Abdel Dayem & Fatima Ayub, In the Path of Allah:
Evolving Interpretations ofJihad and Its Modern Challenges, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 67, 91
(2009). See also HIMLI M. ZAWATI, IS JIHAD A JUST WAR? WAR, PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
ISLAMIC AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001).
21. See JOHN MARK MATrOX, ST. AUGUSTINE AND THE THEORY OF JUST WAR 1-4 (2006).
22. Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichean, bk. XXII, chap. 74, reprinted in THE ETHICS
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Roman Empire with the early Christians' embrace of pacifism.24 For this
reason, he cautioned against violence motivated by libido dominandi, or in self-
interest.25 Rather, to set the warrior's conscience at peace, Augustine ordered
that wars be "loving acts" of punishment, intended to save the transgressor
26from injury to himself and others. Divine intervention ensured that the just
27party emerged victorious.
The scholastics and canonists followed Augustine's formulation of just
war. Gratian adopted the divine judicial model of war in the twelfth century, 2 8
and a century later, Thomas Aquinas demanded a subjective element of guilt
that justified the punitive act of war. 29 In the sixteenth century, Cajetan
(Thomas de Vio) reiterated the punitive measure of war, noting that the
Commonwealth was entitled to wage war not only in self-defense, "but also to
exact revenge for injuries to itself or its members."30 In equating war with a
criminal proceeding, he noted: "That [war] is a criminal matter is clear from the
fact that it leads to the killing and enslavement of persons and the destruction of
goods."3  Following the Reformation, the punitive theory of war persisted
among Protestants and Catholics alike. Calvin asserted that "kings and people
must sometimes take up arms to execute such public vengeance," and that wars
were lawful to "punish evil deeds." 32 Luther, too, asked rhetorically, "What
else is war but the punishment of wrong and evil?"33
After "the last of the scholastics" of the sixteenth century,34 just war
theory took a more secular turn. For Alberico Gentili, Hugo Grotius, Christian
Wolff, and Emmerich de Vattel, natural law determined the justness of war,
rather than the judgment of a priest or church. 5 Religious justifications for war
(especially for wars in Western Europe) subsided, leaving only punishment for
injury to the sovereign or his nationals as the legitimate cause for war. "Injury"
was broadly defined to include not only harm suffered by the war-waging state,
but also transgressions that "grossly violate the law of nature or of nations in
24. Van Elbe, supra note 19, at 667.
25. AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 593 (Henry Bettenson
trans., Penguin Books 1972) (translating libido dominandi as "lust for domination").
26. Id. at 556-58.
27. Van Elbe, supra note 19, at 667.
28. Gratian, Decretum, pt. II, causa 23, question II, canon 1, reprinted in Reichberg, supra
note 22, at 113.
29. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, question 40, art. 1, reprinted in
Reichberg, supra note 22, at 177.
30. CAJETAN, COMMENTARY TO SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, question. 40, art. 1, reprinted
in Reichberg, supra note 22, at 242.
31. Id. at 247.
32. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. IV, ch. 20, at 11, reprinted in
Reichberg, supra note 22, at 276.
33. Martin Luther, Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, reprinted in Reichberg, supra note
22, at 269.
34. These were Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, who maintained the judicial model
of war as vindictive justice, and held fast to the belief that God awarded victory to the righteous
sovereign while guaranteeing the due process of war to the injuring sovereign. See Arthur Nussbaum,
Just War: A Legal Concept, 42 MICH. L. REv. 453,458-62,464-69 (1943).
35. Id. at 464-69.
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regard to any person whatsoever." As examples of such transgressions,
Grotius named "those who act with impiety towards their ancestors," "those
who feed on human flesh," and "those who practise piracy."37
Punitive wars under the Just War tradition were not only an international
political inevitability; they were the ultimate measure of both justice and peace,
necessary to safeguard the rights of individual sovereigns as well as to preserve
the stability of the international system. For Francisco Suarez, "'the only reason
for [war] is that an act of punitive justice is indispensable to mankind, and that
no more fitting means for it is forthcoming within the limits of nature and
human action."' 38 With the turn to a secular conception of Just War, religious
sensibilities gave way to concerns about the honor and dignity of injured
sovereigns. War may be waged to avenge an injury received, argued Gentili,
"because he who fails to avenge one injury provokes another. And to remedy
loss is beneficial. Kings and kingdoms stand by names and reputation. Their
good name must be protected."3 9 Grotius, too, believed that war as punishment
was essential for the international system, serving the good of the offender, the
good of the enforcer, and the good of men at large, "by the protection afforded
by the fear of punishment,"40 i.e., deterrence.
Importantly, just punishment had its limits, as the Just War tradition
distinguished between legitimate punishment and ruthless vengeance. There
were important restrictions on what measures could be used during the war and
even greater limits on punishment after the war. Like the decision to go to war,
the determination of what constituted a just post-conflict punishment was also
an adjudicative process, with the punishing victor expected to act not as a
vengeful party, but as an impartial judge. Such "impartial" punishment,
however, allowed not only for the reversal of the injury (including recovery of
what was unlawfully taken), but also for recovery of the expenses of war
(often, a considerable amount) as well as some measure of punitive reparations
for purposes of future individual or general deterrence.4 '
There were undoubtedly important nuances ahong the writers of the
period with regard to the origins and contours of what constituted a just cause
for war, what goals were served by punishment, and from whom derived the
authority to punish (God or sovereign). 42 It is also the case that war-as-
36. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, bk. 2, chap. 20, sec. 40, reprinted in Reichberg, supra note
22, at 407.
37. Id.
38. Alexis Blane & Benedict Kingsbury, Punishment and the lus Post Bellum, in THE ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: ALBERICO GENTILI AND THE JUSTICE OF EMPIRE 241, 243-44
(Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann eds., 2010) (quoting Francisco Suarez, De Triplici Virtue
(1621)).
39. THOMAS ALFRED WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 256 (photo. reprint
William S. Hein & Co. 2004) (1899).
40. Id. at 305.
41. Blane & Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 260-63; Stephen C. Neff, Conflict Termination and
Peace-Making in the Law of Nations, in JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM
CONFLICT TO PEACE 77, 80-81 (Carsten Stahn & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2008).
42. For an elaborate study of the different conceptions of war as punishment in the writings of
Vitoria, Gentili, and Grotius, see Blane & Kingsbury, supra note 38. See also RICHARD TUCK, THE
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punishment was only one element in a broader conception of war as a dispute
settlement mechanism, in which an injured party, having exhausted all other
means of recovery, could avenge its cause through war.43 In fact, according to
some legal historians, such as Peter Haggenmacher, just war theory was about
property rights much more than about criminal law and punishment.44 Still, the
general view that just war theory included an element of retributive punishment
has persisted in many contemporary accounts. 45
The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed a transformation
of the international system, and with it, of international legal thought. With the
Peace of Westphalia, the principalities and small states of 1648 unified into
larger nation states, and national rulers superseded dynastic ruling families.46
The limited wars of the eighteenth century gave way to ideological total wars,
and small professional armies, motivated mainly by monetary gain, yielded to
Napoleon's Grand Armie marching on nationalistic zeal. The international
system became an anarchic amalgamation of equally sovereign states, which
could not be subjected to any external constraint in the form of divine order or
natural justice. Instead, "sovereign states [had] an unqualified right to resort to
war."47
Interestingly, during this time, wars were neither about retribution nor
prevention, but merely a matter of national expediency and ideological urge. It
was not that states did not invoke legal, moral or pragmatic justifications when
waging wars, nor that the question of the right to resort to force was left
entirely unaddressed by scholars of the period.48 For the most part, however,
the legal status of war under various circumstances was the result of a
positivist, inductive study of state practice more than an engagement with its
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO
KANT 158-62 (1999) (discussing Pufendorf's criticism of Grotius's view of a natural right of
punishment).
43. Neff, supra note 41, at 78.
44. PETER HAGGENMACHER, GROTIUS ET LA DOCTRINE DE LA GUERRE JUSTE 308 (1983).
45. See Blane & Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 244; see also Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad
Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 963, 966 (2008).
46. For a wonderful historical account of the wars in that period, see MICHAEL HOWARD, THE
INVENTION OF PEACE 16-31 (2000).
47. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions, 95 POL. SCI. QUART. 83, 88-89
(1980) (citing Josef Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 325 (1960) ("[U]nder
general international law, as it stood up to 1914, any state could at any time and for any reason go to war
without committing an international delinquency. The jus ad bellum [right to resort to war] remained
unrestricted.")).
48. When justifications for war were offered, they sometimes took the form of quasi-judicial
or policing operation. For instance, against the background of the British-French-German aggression
against Venezuela, Theodore Roosevelt stated in his 1904 Annual Message to Congress:
All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and
prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our
hearty friendship .... Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general
loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately
require intervention by some civilized nation, and . .. may force the United States . . . to
the exercise of an international police power.
President Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1904) (transcript available at
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/us-relations/roosevelt-corollary.htm).
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normative underpinnings. Wars were a phenomenon not to be morally judged,
but only explained. This position was best captured by Carl Von Clausewitz,
who described wars as a "true political instrument, a continuation of political
intercourse, carried on with other means." 49
World War I, however, was a transformative event that demonstrated the
perils of Clausewitz's vision of total wars and the extension of politics into
battle. The international community thus sought to regulate war once more; it
was here that the focus of war began turning from the implementation of justice
to the preservation of peace. This renewed interest in the legal regulation of
wars was expressed in two instruments, both part of the postwar Treaty of
Versailles. One was the coercive victors' justice embodied by the "War Guilt
Clauses" (to which I return later in this article);50 the other was a blueprint for a
first attempt at an international institution with the power to regulate, and
hopefully, prevent wars-the League of Nations. Punishment and prevention
were thus both still at play. From here onwards, the tension between the
punitive urge and the preventive ideal were constantly present in the
development of international law and institutions.
The framers of the League of Nations envisioned their project as the
guardian of world peace, under the Westphalian principles of respect for
territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. International
disputes were to be resolved through arbitration, judicial settlement, or inquiry
by the League's Council. League members agreed that "[a]ny war or threat of
war . .. is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the
League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to
safeguard the peace of nations." 5 The right to engage in war was not, however,
abolished; it was simply subjected to a procedural mechanism of
consultation,52 which, so it was hoped, could avert the war.53
The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact represented further steps toward
regulation. The pact constituted a bolder effort to prevent wars by restricting
the legal right to wage them. It condemned "recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies" and renounced the use of war "as an instrument of
national policy." 54 However, it did not outlaw all uses of force, nor did it
explicitly prohibit violence in self-defense.
49. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1832).
50. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of
Versailles), June 28, 1919, arts. 231-47, 2 Bevans 43, 137-59 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
51. Id. art. 11, at 51-52.
52. League of Nations Covenant art. 12.
53. In 1931, League members also signed a General Convention to Improve the Means of
Preventing War, which empowered the League Council, in the face of a threat of war, to "fix lines which
must not be passed by [the potential belligerents'] land, naval or air forces." General Convention to
Improve the Means of Preventing War art. 3, para. 1, League of Nations Doc. C.658(l).M.269(l).193 LIX
(1931).
54. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-
Briand Pact), art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
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Diplomats in subsequent years worked to make the Pact more
comprehensive. In particular, they sought to broaden the terms of the Pact to
cover unilateral armed reprisals, previously recognized as legitimate means of
avenging wrongs without waging a full-fledged war. They also sought to limit
the permissible scope of self-defense. In 1933, the League of Nations convened
a Preliminary Study Conference on Collective Security to address preventive
measures to avert the threat of war.55 The Austrian delegation to the Study
Conference suggested it would be "[a] tremendous step forward" if "all acts
committed in self-defence were prohibited, with the exception of acts of self-
defence in cases of emergency in the technical sense of the expression, that is,
for the purpose of repelling an attack on national territory."56 Even more
restrictively, a French delegate at a subsequent League of Nations conference
insisted that "it is of paramount importance that peace be maintained, whatever
may be the wrongs endured by the State which has been attacked."
Nonetheless, even here, retribution and punishment had not been entirely
excised from the legal framework. The aim of establishing an impartial justice
system for the international community required League delegates to define and
criminalize aggression. In a move away from earlier notions of war-as-
punishment, the League now sought punishment-for-war:
Why is the need felt of determining the guilty party? It is not for the pleasure of
attributing blame or praise; it is because the point of departure is the idea that
the aggression must be repressed, that sanctions must be applied to the guilty
and aid brought to the victim or victims.59
Notably, unlike the present-day effort of defining the crime of aggression
for purposes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,60 the
crime of aggression that the League considered was attributed to the state, not
to an individual. For all their good intentions, however, the interwar efforts at
abolishing the unilateral use of force and preventing wars more generally failed
to thwart the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the 1935 Italian invasion of
Abyssinia, the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938, or the German
55. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, PERMANENT CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, A SHORT
RECORD OF PRELIMINARY STUDY CONFERENCE ON "COLLECTIVE SECURITY" HELD IN PARIS ON MAY
24-26, 1934, at 9 (International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation ed., 1934) [hereinafter LEAGUE OF
NATIONS STUDY CONFERENCE]. As it was broadly conceived, prevention included "the peaceful
alteration of the status quo in order to remove the causes of international disputes by rectifying
economic and political inequalities and injustices between nations." Id. at 24.
56. Id. at 41.
57. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION, COLLECTIVE SECURITY: A
RECORD OF THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES CONFERENCES, PARIS 1934-LONDON
1935, at 298 (Maurice Bourquin ed., 1936) (remarks of A. Camille Jordan) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE
SECURITY]. He then added: "Thus the Conventions of London condemn the forcible methods hitherto
frequently employed as sanctions for the repression of infractions of international law. What the
signatories wished to obtain was, in the words of M. Politis, 'that the idea of peace be recognised as
having a sort of priority. . . .' Id.
58. See, e.g., Convention for the Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, 147 L.N.T.S. 67.
59. COLLECTIVE SECURITY, supra note 57, at 329 (remarks of A. Camille Jordan); see also id.
at 333 (remarks of Robert Forges-Davanzati) ("Certainly, if we cannot determine the aggressor, if we do
not know who is qualified to decide who is the aggressor, all discussion about the prevention of
aggression and about the sanctions to be applied to the aggressor loses its value.").
60. ICC Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Resolution RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010).
68 [Vol. 3 8: 5 7
The Crime and Punishment of States
invasion of Poland a few months later, an act which heralded the worst war in
human history.6 '
At the close of the Second World War, peace and security from war
became the paramount interest of the new international order. The Allies set out
to establish a reformed model of the failed League of Nations, one that would
guard against a recurrence of a world-war catastrophe. The United Nations
Charter, concluded in 1945, stated as its first and foremost goal "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind." 62 To this end, the signatories sought
"to unite [their] strength to maintain international peace and security, and to
ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."63
The regulation of the use of force under the U.N. Charter was in many
ways a continuation of the prewar efforts toward collective security. This time,
however, it provided a clearer prescription of obligations and prohibitions,
ultimately creating a preventive regime for the use of force. A three-tier system
explicitly outlawed any threat or use of force," leaving two narrow exceptions.
The first is the use of force in individual or collective self-defense by states in
response to an armed attack, under Article 51 of the Charter. Under this
exception, the use of force was to be defensive only, with the sole aim of
preventing further violence. Indeed, in the International Court of Justice's (ICJ)
subsequent interpretation of Article 51, the court noted that to use force in self-
defense, not only must the victim state experience an armed attack, but its
response must be "necessary and proportionate." 65 The requirement of
proportionality "limits a response to what is needed to reply to an attack."66
Conceived in this way, the use of force could only be preventive, not
retributive.
The second exception to the prohibition on use of force is military action
authorized by the UNSC. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSC is
entrusted with "[determining] the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and . .. mak[ing] recommendations, or
decid[ing] what measures shall be taken . .. to maintain or restore international
61. These efforts did, however, lay the foundation for the subsequent indictment and
conviction of Nazi and Japanese officials for crimes against the peace in the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals, respectively. See 12 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 60 (1947-1948); see also Int'l Military Trib. for the Far E.
Judgment, Annex "B" (Relevant Treaties, Conventions, Agreements, and Assurances Upon Which the
Charges were Based), http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-B.html.
62. U.N. Charter pmbl.; see also BRUNO SIMMA ET AL., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 792 (2d ed. 2002) (claiming the Charter intended "to restrict as far as
possible the use of force by the individual State").
63. U.N. Charter pmbl.
64. Id. art. 2, para. 4 ("All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
65. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
41 (July 8).
66. Id. 15 (Higgins, J., dissenting); see also Michael Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use
ofForce in International Law, 79 INT'L L. STUD. 7, 27-28 (2002).
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peace and security."67 The terms "a threat to the peace," a "breach of the
peace," or "an act of aggression" were nowhere defined or elaborated in the
Charter. The UNSC was hence left with maximum flexibility to determine
when and how it was necessary to address a particular situation. Among the
measures it was empowered to authorize were non-military sanctions, and if
those failed, "demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations."69
The Charter's innovation was to recognize the inevitability of war, with
the hope that the collective security design would deter and preempt the
unilateral use of force. Delegates to the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco
conferences were explicit about the possible need to use force to prevent worse
force: "We now see that measures of conciliation and appeasement are not
enough, that war has to be prevented at all costs, even at the cost of war itself,
if necessary." 70 Delegates also emphasized the Charter's Chapter VII vision,
though never fulfilled, of U.N. armed forces and their hoped-for deterrence
effects:
If called upon to do so by the Security Council, the entire force will march
against a State convicted of aggression, in accordance with the provisions for
enforcement as laid down for the Security Council . . . . the certainty of defeat
will most probably discourage any aggressor from starting a fight.n
The Charter thus initially intended to achieve peace through a
combination of prevention and punishment, if necessary, by war. Yet, while the
emphasis on prevention was clear (the Charter emphasized "threats to
international peace and security"), the language of punishment and guilt was
entirely ambivalent. Even the inclusion of the term "act of aggression" was
hotly debated.72 Suggestions to define the term were rejected as impractical,
likely under-inclusive and open to manipulation by would-be aggressors.
Opponents further held that the determination of whether aggression has
67. U.N. Charter art. 39.
68. Id. art 41.
69. Id. art 42.
70. Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister and Chairman of S. Afr., Address
Before the Sixth Plenary Session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (May
1, 1945), in I DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,
1945, at 423 (William S. Hein & Co. 1998) (1945) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION]. The continuation of the quote reads: "The Covenant did not
undertake to prevent war at all costs but merely to create measures of delay and attempts at arbitration
and negotiation and conciliation and finally to invoke economic sanctions to frighten off the aggressors.
The Dumbarton Oaks Charter, on the other hand, realistically recognizes that war must be prevented at
the start, and that no half measures to that end will suffice." Id.
71. Joseph Paul-Boncour, Acting Chairman of the French Delegation, Address Before the
Closing Session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (June 26, 1945), in
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 70, at 699-700.
72. Under Soviet pressure, it was ultimately inserted, even though the United States
considered the phrase "breach of the peace" broad enough to cover aggression. PAGE WILsON,
AGGRESSION, CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 73 (2009).
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occurred and how it should best be dealt with should be left for the UNSC as
the need arose.
One might argue, of course, that the concept of aggression belongs in the
category of threat rather than guilt. However, there is substantial evidence to
suggest that U.N. members viewed "aggression" as connoting guilt as well, and
that this sensitive association is what often impeded agreement over what
"aggression" meant.74 In 1974, the General Assembly finally reached an
agreement over a proposed definition of "aggression,"7  but even that
definition was never invoked or referenced by the UNSC in any subsequent
determination.76
These debates over the definition of aggression were but a reflection of a
broader ideological dispute about whether the U.N. should be in the business of
assigning blame at all. Certainly, some states held onto a state-oriented punitive
mindset at San Francisco, relying, in part, on the dismal record of the former
institution entrusted with preventing wars:
Only if conditions are created such as will guarantee that no violation of the
peace or the threat of such violation shall go unpunished, and the adoption of
necessary punitive measures is not too late, will the organization of security be
able to discharge its responsibility for the cause of peace.77
Ultimately, however, the U.N. Charter system reflected the belief that if
peace is to be preferred, the UNSC must be endowed with maximum flexibility
to order actions to restore or promote peace and security; and that this was
especially the case given the difficulty of agreeing on what the "crime of
aggression" actually meant. Effective policing and prevention was thus
preferred to judicial-like punishment. As Oscar Schachter explained in 1965,
[t]his is evidenced, in some measure, by the fact that, even when complaints
and charges of violations are made, the organs are usually reluctant to decide
the issue of responsibility; they tend to adopt recommendations or decisions
which avoid judgments on the charges made and seek to bring about a
settlement or adjustment of the dispute without determining guilt or innocence
of any party. Their objective is a resolution which will be acceptable and
therefore likely to be implemented by the governments directly concerned; it
73. LELAND GOODRICH, EDVARD HAMBRO & ANNE SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 263-64 (2d ed. 1969).
74. Id. at 47-48. See also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970)
("A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under
international law.").
75. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
76. See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Definition ofAggression, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT'L L. 3
(2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/da/da e.pdf ("Paragraph 4 of resolution 3314 (XXIX) drew
the attention of the Security Council to the Definition and recommended that the Council 'should, as
appropriate, take account of that Definition as guidance in determining, in accordance with the Charter,
the existence of an act of aggression.' The Definition has rarely if ever been used for that purpose.").
77. Address by V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Delegation of the U.S.S.R., Address Before
the First Plenary Session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (Apr. 26,
1945), in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 70, at 135;
see also Dr. T. V. Soong, Chairman of the Delegation of the Republic of China, Address Before the First
Plenary Session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (Apr. 26, 1945), in
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 70, at 129-30.
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will often not serve this end to decide whether the charges and counter-charges
of illegality are well founded.
The new use-of-force regime's focus on prevention was especially
apparent in its attempt to ban armed reprisals, or the use of force short of war-
a prevalent state practice. As the design of the U.N. Charter's collective
security architecture was meant to discourage vigilantism, reprisals no longer
fit. In 1964, UNSC Resolution 188 explicitly condemned reprisals as
"incompatible with the purposes and principle of the United Nations,"7 and in
1970, the U.N. General Assembly adopted its Declaration on Friendly
Relations,80 noting that "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal
involving the use of force." 8' To the extent that a meaningful distinction could
be drawn between reprisal and self-defense, particularly given that both kinds
of actions are typically taken after an attack is suffered, the difference has been
commonly framed in terms of the actions' purposes; the former is retributive,
whereas the latter is preventive:
Measures of self-defense are not considered as sanctions; though taken in
response to, or in anticipation of, unlawful behavior, they do not have a
punitive character. Instead, self-defense is considered to have a. strictly
protective or preventive purpose. By contrast, reprisals are considered as
sanctions and are judged to have a punitive character. 82
The logic of the ban on reprisals was summed up by Bruno Simma: "[I]t
cannot be overlooked that, being caught in the 'dilemma between security and
justice[,'] the UN Charter deliberately gives preference to the former." 83
Nevertheless, the Charter's very narrow construction of when force could
84be used, coupled with the general ineffectiveness of the U.N. collective
security system, has not stopped states from engaging in armed reprisals.85
78. Oscar Schachter, The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the General
Assembly, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 960, 961 (1964).
79. S.C. Res. 188, U.N. Doc. S/5650 (Apr. 9, 1964). The Resolution was adopted when
Yemen submitted a complaint to the Security Council over a British air attack on Yemeni territory on
March 28, 1964.
80. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nation, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 122 (Oct. 24, 1970).
8 1. Id.
82. Robert Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 66 AM.. J. INT'L L. 586,
589 (1972); see also SIMMA ET AL., supra note 62, at 805 ("[L]awful self-defence is restricted to the
repulse of an armed attack and must not entail retaliatory or punitive actions. The means and extent of
the defence must not be disproportionate to the gravity of the attack; in particular, the means employed
for the defence have to be strictly necessary for repelling the attack."); Derek Bowett, Reprisals
Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1972).
83. SIMMA ET AL., supra note 62, at 792 (citation omitted).
84. Further limiting the right to use force was the high threshold placed by the International
Court of Justice to what would amount to an "armed attack" that would justify the use of defensive
force. See id. at 792-93 ("[A] State is bound to endure acts of force that do not reach the intensity of an
armed attack, thus remaining devoid of any effective protection until the [Security Council] has taken
remedial measures. [I]t cannot be overlooked that being caught in the 'dilemma between security and
justice,' the UN Charter deliberately gives preference to the former.").
85. See Tucker, supra note 82, at 595 ("A narrow interpretation of self-defense... must
generate considerable, and, in the end, irresistible, pressures to effect some kind of rehabilitation of
armed reprisals.").
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Indeed political speeches addressed to the domestic population often used the
language of retribution and punishment when justifying such actions. For
example, in 1986 the United States struck targets in Libya in Operation El-
Dorado Canyon. The strikes followed a Libyan-backed terrorist attack on La
Belle discotheque in West Berlin, which resulted in two fatalities and hundreds
of injuries, many of whom were American military personnel. In justifying the
strikes, President Reagan laid out the evidence that linked the terrorists to
86
Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The evidence, he claimed, was
"direct ... precise ... [and] irrefutable."87 He spoke of the advance warnings
that were given to Qaddafi, promising to hold the latter's regime accountable
for any terrorist attack launched against American citizens, warnings which
Qaddafi did not heed. Reagan also charged that Qaddafi's actions required
putting him "outside the company of civilized men."88 However, conscious of
the mixed audience he was addressing-the American voter and the
international community-the punitive rhetoric was nonetheless carefully
accompanied by a reference to Article 51 of the Charter and the right of self-
defense against terrorism.
Thus, after long struggles between the punitive and preventive paradigms
in justifying wars, the present-day international community has opted for the
latter. As the international community's focus has turned toward peace and
stability under the U.N. Charter, this preference for preventive paradigms has
crystallized. U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force
under Chapter VII never invoke the language of punishment, but only the
rhetoric of combating threats to peace and security. 9 0 Nevertheless, individual
leaders do speak of "punishment" when addressing their domestic populations.
It is only in the international context that they are careful to link their actions to
the right of self-defense under Article 51.
86. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Address to the Nation on the United States




89. Id. ("Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission
undertaken tonight, a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.").
90. For example, the UNSC's Resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq in 1990:
Resolution 678 stated:
The Security Council,
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its
obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990).. . . Mindful of its duties and
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and
preservation of international peace and security
Authorizes Member States . .. to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
resolution 660 (1990) .. . and to restore international peace and security in the area.
S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29,1990).
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B. Punishment in War: Jus in Bello
For centuries, the sovereign, state, and people, comprised a single unified
entity; punishing the sovereign therefore entailed punishing her state and
subjects as well. Vendetta against the populations of defeated countries, even if
not unbounded, was a legitimate means of allocating justice, and often included
murder, rape, and enslavement. However, in modem times, this form of
"punishment" has also faded from the international scene, being replaced by a
humanitarian law regime that focuses on the threats posed by individuals in
war, not the guilt of the state as such. Here too, violence can be used
preventively, but never as punishment.
The long-standing dependence of the justness of harm in war on the
justness of the war meant that when sovereigns waged war in the name of
justice, force used during this war against the defending people as a whole was
also generally considered just. With the secularization of political rule in the
early modem period, however, the sovereign no longer embodied the state, and
the people were no longer her property. As Hugo Grotius, and then Immanuel
Kant, developed the distinction between jus in bello and the jus ad bellum, the
justification for employing force against the sovereign could extend only to
justify deliberate harm to combatants, acting as agents of the sovereign.
Violence could no longer be waged against the population as a whole.
The independence of the jus in bello from the jus ad bellum and the
distinction between the sovereign and people were eventually codified into the
present-day principle of distinction found in the Geneva Conventions.91 Under
the Conventions, the fate of individuals came to depend on their contribution to
the war effort and the military necessity of killing or disabling them. Replacing
"guilt" with "threat" in this way more easily justified the infliction of harm on
enemy nationals. 92 All able combatants are thus targetable as fighting agents of
their governments, while all other individuals, including disabled combatants,
are to be spared. Those who are to be spared are sometimes referred to as
"innocent," not because they are morally not guilty, but because they are non-
threatening. Interestingly, the term "innocent" has never appeared in modem
international treaties, but is commonly invoked in commentary and rhetoric,
suggesting, perhaps, an intuitive association between fighting and guilt.
In accordance with this principle, the wagers of contemporary western
wars take care, in spelling out their targets, to distinguish among rogue
leadership that must be stopped and the people that must be protected. 93 The
91. See, e.g., Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 [hereinafter Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 Aug 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, 51(3),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter APIQ; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 Aug 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts art 13(3),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17513 [hereinafter APII].
92. See OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE JUST WAR REVISITED 36-42 (2003).
93. In his address to the nation justifying the 1986 attack on Libya, President Reagan added:
Before Qaddafi seized power in 1969, the people of Libya had been friends of the United
States, and I'm sure that today most Libyans are ashamed and disgusted that this man has
74 [Vol. 3 8: 5 7
The Crime and Punishment ofStates
state itself is hardly ever an "enemy." In this vein, NATO leaders, for example,
made a point of singling out Milogevi6 and his forces as the intended targets in
their 1999 military campaign for Kosovo, and emphasized the need to
distinguish between "innocent" civilians and "enemy" forces within the people
of Serbia.94 Recall also the EU's statement, "[w]e have no quarrel with the
Iranian people." 95
The shift away from the use of punishment in war has been most
pronounced in the evolution of two interrelated prohibitions: the ban on all
forms of collective punishment and the subsequent prohibition on belligerent
reprisals. The Hague Regulations of 190796 and the Third and Fourth Geneva
Conventions of 194997 codified the earlier customary prohibitions on imposing
sanctions on civilians and prisoners of war for offenses they did not personally
commit. The 1977 Additional Protocols reiterated this prohibition,98 and its
official Commentary explained: "The concept of collective punishment must be
understood in the broadest sense: it covers not only legal sentences but
sanctions and harassment of any sort, administrative, by police action or
otherwise."99 Numerous international human rights instruments included
similar prohibitions in regulating the relationship between governments and
their own people.' 00
Yet a comprehensive ban on collective punishment faces unique
conceptual and practical challenges regarding war. War is collective violence.
It is violence between or among collectives, exercised in the name of those
collectives, for the (supposed) benefit of collectives. By its very nature it entails
harm of every kind to wide populations, including the innocent. Any attempt to
made their country a synonym for barbarism around the world. The Libyan people are a
decent people caught in the grip of a tyrant.
Reagan, supra note 86.
94. See, e.g., STEVEN HALLOCK, REPORTERS WHO MADE HISTORY: GREAT AMERICAN
JOURNALISTS ON THE ISSUES AND CRISES OF THE LATE 20TH CENTURY 262 (2009) ("As a result, NATO
forces were able to hold civilian casualties to a very low level while concentrating on the military
targets." (citing Kosovo After the Strikes: Secretary Cohen, General Wald and General Shelton Brief
Reporters (CNN television broadcast June 10, 1999))); William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, et al.,
Defense Department Briefing on Serb Withdrawal from Kosovo and NATO Bombing Pause, PENTAGON
FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 10, 1999 ("It's a fight against ethnic and religious hatred, the lack of
tolerance for others, and the right to live in peace. The United States and NATO used force as a last
resort and only after Milogevid refused to respond to diplomatic initiatives. And when diplomacy failed,
NATO used force judiciously and effectively to achieve its goals.").
95. Statement on Iran Sanctions, supra note 2.
96. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 50, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277
[hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
97. Geneva IV, supra note 91, art. 33.
98. API, supra note 91, arts. 75(1), 75(4)(b); APII, supra note 91, arts. 4(2)(b), 6(2)(b).
99. ICRC, Part IV: Civilian Population #Section III-Treatment of Persons in the Power of a
Party to the Conflict #Chapter I-Field of Application and Protection of Persons and Objects, T 3055
(1978) (Commentary to Additional Protocol I), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfcom/470-750096?open document.
100. The prohibition against collective punishment within the human rights regime is primarily
associated with due process guarantees, including the right to a fair trial and the presumption of
innocence. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 1916
U.S.T. 521; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights) art. 6, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), art. 11, U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 (1948).
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fully protect the innocent from the engulfing nature of the war is bound to fail.
The laws of war are thus left to manage the tension between the need to allow
for the conduct of war, which will inevitably result in some harm to the
innocent, and the need to protect the innocent from such an excessive degree of
harm that even war cannot justify.
The current humanitarian law regime therefore strives to strike a balance
between the acceptable harm associated with collateral damage and preventive
action, and the unacceptable harm associated with collective punishment. But it
is an uneasy balance. Alongside absolute prohibitions on targeting or
terrorizing the civilian population, the law allows for the unintentional (even if
foreseen) and proportionate infliction of "collateral damage."' 0' Alongside the
prohibition on collective punishment, the laws of war do allow, implicitly or
explicitly, a host of permissible measures, such as curfews, searches, and other
impediments to movement or breaches of privacy, even where such measures
inevitably harm the innocent.102 Such dualism exists with regard to property as
well: pillaging is absolutely prohibited, but a belligerent party may destroy or
seize enemy property if "such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war."' 03 In occupied territory, "[r]equisitions in kind and
services shall not be demanded .. . except for the needs of the army of
occupation,"l04 and "[a]ny destruction by the Occupying Power of real or
personal property . .. is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations." 05 The line distinguishing
permissible from impermissible harm is thus an opaque and easily manipulable,
dual-head test of intent and proportion: (1) A permissible security measure
must be motivated by a legitimate security need, which means it must be
preventive in its motivation; and (2) It must meet a needs-harm proportionality
test of being either "limited strictly to military objectives" or not "excessive" in
relation to the anticipated military advantage.' 0 6
From an observer's point of view, it is often difficult to tell whether a
collective measure is a permissible security tool, withstanding the test of
legitimate intention and proportionate harm, or whether it is an impermissible
act of collective punishment. Evidently, the dual test of intent and
proportionality allows any belligerent or occupier much room for both
101. See, e.g., Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia PR/P.I.S./510-E (June 13,
2000), TT 28, 51 [hereinafter Final Report].
102. See, e.g., Hague Convention IV, supra note 96, art. 43 ("The authority of the legitimate
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."); see also Michael J. Dennis, Application of
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times ofArmed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM.
J. INT'L L. 119, 135 (2005) ("Villagers were required to come and go according to a strict curfew and
acquire numbered identification cards to leave and reenter the village. Yet the coalition states did not
purport to derogate from any provision of the ICCPR. .. .").
103. Hague Convention IV, supra note 96, art. 23(g).
104. Id. art. 52.
105. Geneva IV, supra note 91, art. 53.
106. API, supra note 91, arts 51(5)(b), 52(2).
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legitimate and illegitimate means of subordinating the local population to its
will.107 Intentions, after all, are what actors declare them to be. And more often
than not, especially when dealing with a hostile population, intentions are
mixed. Proportionality, too, is far from an objective and easily measurable
standard, especially as the values weighed to measure it are incommensurable.
Several recent and contemporary examples demonstrate the difficulty in
distinguishing unlawful punishment from lawful prevention. In all these cases,
it would be virtually impossible to trace the "real" intention behind the
measures imposed; nor is there necessarily a single intention motivating them.
What is obvious, however, is that any party who wishes to employ such means
must invoke the language of prevention, and never of retribution or
punishment, if it seeks legitimacy under international law.
For example, when demolishing houses of suicide bombers, Israel often
stated its intention is the legitimate goal of deterring future terrorists from
similar attacks on Israeli citizens. os To others, however, it appeared an
illegitimate act of revenge upon the terrorist's family. Similar debates surround
the Israeli-imposed closure of the past four years on Hamas-led Gaza. Is it an
act driven by genuine security concerns, a legitimate measure between two
warring entities, or a means of collective punishment of the population of Gaza,
in part, for voting Hamas into power? Similar controversies also surrounded
military operations elsewhere. In May 2007, American forces imposed a curfew
on 300,000 residents in Samarra, Iraq, after a terrorist bomb attack killed
twelve Iraqi police officers. The American forces cited the prevention of further
attacks and the protection of reconstruction projects in the area as their purpose;
yet after twelve days, with food and other supplies beginning to wane, the NGO
Doctors for Iraq declared the curfew to be collective punishment. 09 The only
thing that remains clear is that in each case, the acting state sought to legitimize
its actions by invoking the language of prevention.
The focus on "threats," and general aversion to "guilt," within the laws of
war also prompted a prohibition on belligerent reprisals. 0 Throughout most of
history, the primary mechanism for the enforcement of the laws of war was
self-interest, reinforced through reciprocity. A party was obliged to comply
with agreed-upon humanitarian rules only to the extent that its enemies also
complied. Warring parties were allowed to engage in belligerent reprisals-acts
that would have been unlawful had there not been a preceding violation by the
enemy that justified such unlawful behavior-mostly against civilians or
107. Final Report, supra note 101, 48.
108. See, e.g., Dan Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Territories, 19
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 31 n.153 (1994) (noting that the Court .'conclude[d] that Article 119 serves as a
deterring punitive measure"' (quoting Al Gamal v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region
HCJ 542/89 (1989))).
109. Iraqi Town Struggles Under Curfew, BBCNEWS, May 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/middle east/6671075.stm.
110. This focus on belligerent reprisals in the jus in bello context should not be confused with
armed reprisals in the jus ad bellum context.
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POWs."' Reprisals were lawful means of forcing the enemy into compliance,
and were therefore not subject to the emerging prohibition on collective
punishment. Indeed, their non-retributive nature was a condition for their
lawfulness. Once compliance had been achieved, no further violation was
permitted.l12
The Lieber Code of 1863113 and the 1880 Oxford Manual on the Laws of
War on Landll4 explicitly admitted reprisals, though subject to limitations.
Several attempts at restricting reprisals between the late 1800s and World War I
failed, with the first ban-on reprisals against POWs-adopted in 1929. The
post-World War II war crimes trials jurisprudence on the customary norms
governing belligerent reprisals recognized their legitimacy and upheld their
legality under certain conditions. " The four 1949 Geneva Conventions failed
to include a general prohibition of the practice, but each did contain a ban on
reprisals against a specific category of protected entities-hors de combat (on
land, at sea, and POWs) and civilians at the hands of an enemy power."l 6
However, with the adoption of Additional Protocol I in 1977, an
increased humanitarian drive and expansion of human rights norms further
diverted the focus of the laws of war from the rights of states to the rights of
individuals, so that the protection granted to individuals under the law was
viewed as their own, and not their country's to trade in. Under the Protocol,
reprisals against the civilian population in the territory of the enemy as well as
against most other targets were outlawed (leaving narrow room for reprisals
against able soldiers on the battlefield)."' 7 Under the jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s,
the prohibition on reprisals in non-international armed conflict crystallized."'
As a general matter, present-day reprisals against civilians and other
protected individuals and objects are prohibited. The United States, the United
Kingdom, Italy, and several other countries have reserved a right to engage in
reprisals in extreme circumstances." 9 Nonetheless, the Rome Statute of the
111. See Shane Darcy, The Evolution of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals, 175 MIL. L. REV.
184, 187 (2003).
112. Id. at 187.
113. U.S. Dep't of Army, Gen. Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of
the United States in the Field, art. 28 (Gov. Printing Office 1898) (1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code],
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988).
114. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oxford Manual of the Laws of War on Land, in
RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (1916).
115. United States of America v. Wilhelm List et al., Judgment, Case No. 7, 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10
757, at 1248-51 (1948).
116. See SHANE DARCY, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-46 (2007).
117. API, supra note 91, arts. 51-56.
118. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martic (Rule 61), Case No. IT-95-ll-R61, Decision (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 8, 1996) (Jorda, J. (presiding); Odio Benito, J.; Riad, J.);
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 14, 2000) (Cassese, J. (presiding); May, J.; Mumba, J.); see also Darcy, supra note 111, at 231-43.
119. Italy reserves the right to "react to serious and systematic violations by an enemy of the
obligations imposed by Additional Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means
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International Criminal Court (ICC) makes no exception for reprisals;'1 20 the
Draft Rules on State Responsibility also prohibit any countermeasure that
violates basic humanitarian guarantees; 121 and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has rejected all possible justifications for
reprisals, finding that the prohibition on reprisals was now a customary norm of
the highest order (jus cogens).122
Following the trend of channeling punishment away from states and
toward individual defendants, violations of the rules of lawful warfare can now,
as a matter of international law, be dealt with only through individualized
punishments, 123 which can include public shaming and individual criminal
prosecutions. Whether such post-conflict measures could ever serve as a real
inducement for compliance with the rules during the war is debatable. This
point was not lost on the negotiating parties to the Additional Protocol. During
the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conferences, the French delegate, in introducing a
limited right of reprisals, observed:
From the point of view of effectiveness, [the French] delegation doubted
whether the existing system of penal sanctions provided a true safeguard
against violations of the Conventions. During a period of armed conflict it was
not after the event that the machinery of sanctions should come into action but
at the time when the rule was broken, and when that breach could cause a
serious and perhaps decisive upset in the balance of forces. 124
Still, opponents of the proposal feared that reprisals would be punishment
"wrongly applied" insofar as they usually fall upon the innocent,125 and that a
admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation." API, Ratifications and
Reservations, Italy Reservation Text, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORMIE2F248CE54CF09B5C125640
2003FB443?OpenDocument. The UK holds similarly. API, Ratifications and Reservations, United
Kingdom Reservation Text (2002), http://www.icrc.org/ihI.nsf/NORM/0A9EO3FOF2EE757CC1256402
003FB6D2?OpenDocument; see also INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT-THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 20 (Jeanne M. Meyer & Brian
J. Bill eds., 2002).
120. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b), July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
121. Int'l Law Comm'n, State Responsibility: Draft Articles Provisionally Adopted by the
Drafting Committee on Second Reading, art. 50, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.600 (Aug. 11, 2000), reproduced
at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/projects/state-responsibility_documentcollection.php [hereinafter Draft
Articles].
122. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 511.
123. See George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratication ofAdditional Protocol Ito
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15-17 (1991).
124. Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, Volume IX, Third Session,
46th Meeting, at 58 (CDDH/I/SR.42-65) (summary of the statement of Mr. Girard, France). For similar
positions by Belgium, see id. at 65 (summary of the statement of Mr. de Breucker, Belgium); and id. at
73 (summary of the statement of Mr. Draper, United Kingdom).
125. See id. at 75 (summary of the statement of Mr. Eide, Norway) ("It should be noted that
reprisals represented collective sanctions, and not repressions of breaches in the sense used in articles 74
to 78. The aim there was to pin responsibility on a guilty individual, in which case there would be such
legal safeguards as presumption of innocence. It was considered that the relationship between guilt and
punishment might have a certain restraining effect. But in the French proposal those who committed the
original breach were not necessarily those who suffered from the reprisals . . . .").
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
right of reprisal would lead to escalating cycles of violence.12 6 The aversion to
any form of punishment in war, its effects on the "innocent" and its risk of
inviting further violence, has thus lead to a significant curbing of anything that
might resemble collective punishment, including the ostensibly forward-
looking mechanism of reprisals.
C. Sanctions Outside of War
Since ancient times, states and other sovereign entities have employed a
host of military and non-military sanctions against each other, outside the
framework of war. They do so with the purpose of redressing an injury or
enforcing a legal right. Yet, while previously such sanctions were openly
referred to as punitive, following the First World War, the international
community has couched them only as preventive action.
In what has been described as "the earliest recorded instance of economic
sanctions," in 432 B.C., Athens imposed an import ban on products from
Megara to compel the release of three Athenian women who had been
kidnapped.12 7 Kidnapping of citizens was itself a favorite mode of sanctions
and counter-sanctions throughout the ancient and medieval eras.12 8 Seizure of
foreign property was another familiar mechanism of international coercion,
often with the formal authorization of the sovereign whose citizens suffered
earlier capture of their own property by foreign nationals.12 9 Pacific blockades,
maritime embargoes, and seizure of foreign vessels were likewise acceptable
means of enforcing international rights and obligations. 130
In the nineteenth century, sanctions were referred to as "measures of
constraint short of war," "compulsive means of settlement of state difference,"
and "methods of applying force which are held not to be inconsistent with the
continuance of peaceful relations between the powers concerned.""'3 As far as
international legal doctrine went, sanctions were sometimes classified under the
laws of peace, sometimes under the laws of war. The general understanding
was that sanctions were a permissible measure, short of warfare, to settle a
dispute which could not be resolved by non-coercive means. 132 Of course,
sanctions often had the opposite effect, triggering or lengthening a war rather
than preventing it. 133
The League of Nations' collective security system included the right of
member states to impose sanctions against states that had resorted to war in
126. See id. at 60 (summary of the statement of Mr. Arebi, Libyan Arab Republic); id. at 61-62
(summary of the statement of Mr. Rechetniak, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic); id. at 63 (summary
of the statement of Mr. Kakolecki, Poland); id. at 76 (summary of the statement of Mr. Eide, Norway).
127. JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 45
(2007) (citing ROBIN RENWICK, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1 (1981)).
128. Id. at 46.
129. Id.
130. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 139-50 (H. Lauterpacht, ed., 7th ed.
1952).
131. FARRALL, supra note 127, at 47-48.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 52.
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violation of the Covenant and its dispute settlement system. Sanctions, under
the Covenant, included the severance of all relations on both governmental and
private levels.134 The wording of the sanctions provision suggested that
sanctions were automatically triggered in the case of war. In fact, this was the
original understanding of President Woodrow Wilson in his support of the
League:
Suppose somebody does not abide by these engagements, then what happens?
An absolute isolation, a boycott. The boycott is automatic. There is no "if' or
"but" about it.... It is the most complete boycott ever conceived in a public
document, and I want to say with confident prediction that there will be no
more fighting after that. There is not a nation that can stand that for six
months.135
Quickly, however, it became evident that Wilson's vision was not shared
by the League Members. In 1921, the League adopted a resolution leaving each
member state to decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant had
occurred and whether sanctions were in order. 136 The one concrete experience
of the League's sanctions, imposed on Italy following its invasion of Abyssinia,
proved ineffective in compelling a withdrawal. 137 Instead, Mussolini partnered
with Hitler. 138
Whether sanctions under the League of Nations were designed to serve as
punitive measures was a subject of debate at the time. Indeed, the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, in its 1938 report, denied any such role for
sanctions. 139 Subsequent commentators, however, argued that the League
system sought to establish an international order resembling, as much as
possible, a domestic one, with rules laid out by a competent authority and
transgressions punished by sanctions.140
The debate over whether international sanctions should be viewed as a
mode of punishment continued after the League of Nations era. Under the U.N.
Charter, the UNSC was entrusted with the power to order such measures as
were necessary to restore international peace and security, including "complete
or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations."l41 Military action was to follow only if these less violent
steps proved ineffective. Fredrik Hoffman and David Leyton-Brown both
argued that sanctions were intended to draw the lines between acceptable and
unacceptable behavior, and that it was implied in the very term "sanction" that
it was not merely a political action, but was meant to serve as punishment for
134. League of Nations Covenant art. 16, para. 1.
135. See FARRALL, supra note 127, at 53 (citing M.S. DAOUDI & M.S. DAJANI, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS, IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 26 (1983)).
136. League Assembly Res. 4, League of Nations Doc. A.1921.P, 453 (1921).
137. FARRALL, supra note 127, at 54-56.
138. Id. at 57.
139. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS 13 (1938).
140. Kim Richard Nossal, International Sanctions as International Punishment, 43 INT'L ORG.
301, 310 (1989).
141. U.N. Charter art. 41.
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nations that deserved it.14 2 Kim Nossal has similarly asserted that, especially
when imposed and maintained despite any real prospect of effecting change in
the target state's behavior, sanctions must be understood as punishment,
serving both retributive and symbolic functions.' 43
As a practical matter, in its first forty-five years of operation, the UNSC
ordered sanctions in only two cases: Southern Rhodesia (comprehensive
sanctions, 1966-1979) and South Africa (arms embargo, 1977-1994). 144 With
the end of the Cold War and its attendant gridlock in the UNSC, however,
resolutions imposing sanctions expanded exponentially, addressing situations in
the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1996), Serbia-Montenegro (1992-1996), Somalia
(1992-present), Libya (1992-1999), Liberia (1992-2000), Haiti (1993-1994),
Angola (1993-2002), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996-2001), Sierra Leone (1997),
Taliban-led Afghanistan (1999-2001), North Korea, Iran, and Libya (all still
present).14 5 Sanctions have comprised total or partial economic embargo, travel
and immigration restrictions, blockades, assets freeze, and severance of
diplomatic relations.14 6 Individual countries, too, have imposed a range of
unilateral sanctions on target countries and regimes, including for systematic
violation of human rights (Burma 47) or extra-constitutional changes of power
(Zimbabwe 4).
Importantly, the UNSC never invoked the explicit language of
punishment in any of its resolutions under Chapter VII. Formal justifications
for sanctions, even when citing present or past bad practices, are always
articulated as forward-looking, invoking the interests of enforcement, but never
of retribution. For example, following a nuclear test by North Korea in May
2009, the UNSC condemned the nuclear test (but not the country of North
Korea), added a long list of sanctions, and concluded with the following
statement:
[The UNSC e]xpresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political
solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as
other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution
through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate
tensions; ... Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous
review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the
measures [heretofore approved] . . . as may be needed at that time in light of the
142. Fredrik Hoffman, The Function of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis, 4 J.
PEACE RESEARCH 140, 144 (1967); David Leyton-Brown, Lessons and Policy Considerations About
Economic Sanctions, in THE UTILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 303 (David Leyton-
Brown ed., 1987).
143. Nossal, supra note 140, at 315-21.
144. FARRALL, supra note 127, at 247-61.
145. For these sanctions regimes, see FARRALL, supra note 127, at 282-320, 326-68, 374-95,
452-63.
146. Id. at 124-26, 220, 353.
147. See Press Release, Capitol Hill, Biden Applauds Additional Economic Sanctions on
Burma's Leaders (Oct. 19, 2007).
148. Sam Coates & Jonathan Clayton, Britain Leads Call for Zimbabwe Sanctions To Punish
Mugabe for Stealing Election, TIMES (LONDON), June 16, 2008, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news
/world/africa/article259369.ece.
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DPRK's compliance with relevant provisions of resolution 1718 (2006) and this
resolution. 149
Individual leaders, however, and especially Americans, veered closer to
punitive rhetoric, although for the most part, still in suggestive terms.o50 For
example, in 1979, the United States imposed unilateral sanctions against the
Soviet Union, following the latter's invasion of Afghanistan. President Jimmy
Carter, in justifying the sanctions, stated, "The world simply cannot stand by
and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity."' 5 ' Later, in his
memoirs, he explained that he "was determined to make [the Soviets] pay for
their unwarranted aggression."l52 In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech
in December 2009, President Barack Obama called on world powers to join
hands in sanctions that would "exact a real price" from "nations that break rules
and laws." 5 3 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton later added that nations that
tried to disrupt the U.S.-European efforts to isolate Iran risked punishment,
although she did not specify what form punishment might take.154 On the other
side, Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, criticized western powers for
promoting U.N. sanctions against Iran that introduced an unwarranted "element
of punishment."iss
In legal and political commentary, scholars have often criticized sanctions
as collective punishment, harming the populations of non-democratic regimes
who could have done little to induce a change in their government's policies.
Sanctions, so it is claimed, have often resulted in direct hardship, impeded
longer-term development, and produced adverse externalities for neighboring
countries.156 Against such criticism, the UNSC as well as individual countries
have attempted to design "smart sanctions" that targeted individual regime
members instead of countries as a whole.15 7 Yet, even as applied to individual
leaders, however, the international community was hesitant to invoke any
explicit punitive language, although the punitive urge was highly visible and
acknowledged in public commentary.15 8
149. S.C. Res. 1874, 31-32, U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 874 (June 12, 2009).
150. It is possible that Americans are quicker to invoke the language of punishment, given their
social and cultural attitudes toward the concept that differ from some other countries. For discussion on
that point, see JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
151. Nossal, supra note 140, at 320 (citing Carter's speech).
152. Id. (quoting JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT, 471-72, 476
(1995)).
153. Barack Obama, President of the United States, A Just and Lasting Peace (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture-en.html.
154. Paul Richter, U.S. Signals New Sanctions Against Iran, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, http://www
.1atimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-iran-sanctions 12-2009dec 12,0,1287854.story (paraphrasing
Secretary Clinton's quoted statement: "And I think that if people want to flirt with Iran, they should take
a look at what the consequences might well be for them").
155. Russia Says West Trying To Punish Iran in UN Resolution, RADIO FREE EUROPE: RADIO
LIBERTY, Dec. 20, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073580.html.
156. Margaret P. Doxey, Sanctions Through the Looking Glass: The Spectrum of Goals and
Achievements, 55 INT'L J. 207,208 (2000).
157. FARRALL, supra note 127, at 242.
158. In 2007, President George W. Bush announced additional economic sanctions to be
imposed on Burma's leaders. President Bush did not say anything explicit about punishment, but
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To sum up, non-military sanctions have been growing in number and
expanding in their justifications, with both the UNSC and individual countries
finding them a useful tool of international relations. Formal justifications for
sanctions, even when citing present or past bad practices, are always articulated
as forward-looking, invoking the interests of enforcement or deterrence, but
never of retribution. Nonetheless, for many outside observers, as well as for
leaders speaking outside of the formal international legislative process (as
opposed to domestic policy-making), these sanctions, as the term itself
suggests, serve as backward-looking punishment no less than a future-oriented
prevention.
D. Rules on State Responsibility
The history of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
International Wrongful Acts ("Draft Articles") demonstrates more than any
other legal doctrine the explicit and growing aversion in mainstream
international law to the concept of state crime and punishment. From its
inception in 1949, the International Law Commission (ILC) identified the
question of state responsibility for breaches of international obligations as one
that should be on the ILC's agenda.' 59 Over the next several decades, its
members produced numerous reports and several different versions of the Draft
Articles, the most recent one in 2001.160
Essentially, the Draft Articles espouse that when a state wrongs other
states, any injured state is entitled to engage in countermeasures (short of the
use of force) against the violating state until the violating state ceases to
commit the wrong. The injured state may also be entitled to reparations from it.
Among the contested sections of the Draft Articles have been the consequences
of certain grave wrongs, the availability of punitive damages as an acceptable
form of reparations and the types of countermeasures that a state can employ.
Senator Joseph Biden applauded the decision "to punish eleven more senior Burmese government
officials personally responsible for the violence in Burma." Press Release, Capitol Hill, Biden Applauds
Additional Economic Sanctions on Burma's Leaders (Oct. 19, 2007); see also Australia Tables Bill To
Boost Sanctions Against Zimbabwean Leaders, BBC MONITORING INT'L REPORTS (June 12, 2010)
(offering a media account of an Australian bill imposing sanctions on the leaders of Zimbabwe, Burma,
Fiji, North Korea, former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Iran, which described the bill as
intending "to punish leaders of countries like Zimbabwe for undermining the rule of law, corruption and
human rights violations"); see also Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), http://www.comlaw
.gov.au/Details/C201 1A00038. Britain engaged in efforts in 2008 to coordinate sanctions on Zimbabwe
leader, Robert Mugabe, if the latter refused to step down following loss of power in elections: Britain
reportedly urged South Africa to cut of electricity supplies, worked to persuade Zimbabwe's allies to
mount an economic blockade, and to convince others to place a ban on the children of the elite from
attending school in Europe, if Mugabe "stole the elections." The media labeled the sanctions as
punishment for Mugabe. Sam Coates & Jonathan Clayton, Britain Leads Call for Zimbabwe Sanctions
To Punish Mugabe for Stealing Election, TIMES (London), June 16, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk
/tol/news/world/africa/article4144270.ece.
159. Summary: State Responsibility, INT'L LAW COMM'N (July 12, 2006), http://untreaty.un
.org/ilc/summaries/9_6.htm.
160. Some sections of the Draft Articles are considered customary international law, but others
are still debated, precluding consensus that would allow codifying the text in a binding instrument. LORI
F. DAMROCSH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 686 (2001).
84 [Vol. 38: 57
The Crime and Punishment ofStates
1. From "International Crimes" to "Serious Breaches"
The concept of "international crimes of state" was first incorporated into
the first Draft Articles in 1976. Draft Article 19 defined international crime as
"[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of
an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental
interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime
by that community as a whole."' 6 1 Until then, the prevailing approach had been
the one adopted at Nuremberg-namely, that "crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced." 62 Later described by Crawford as "the single most controversial
element in the draft articles on State responsibility,"' 63 Article 19 was met with
disapproval, from its very inception, for its circularity, its vagueness, and its
failure to stipulate meaningful consequences in case of violation. 164
Indeed, notwithstanding Draft Article 19's use of the word "crime," there
were no accompanying stipulations of punishment in the traditional criminal
sense. 1s The only difference between international crimes and other breaches
of international law was the removal of some restrictions on claims of injury in
cases of crimes and the imposition of obligations on all states to stop "crimes,"
neither of which could plausibly be thought of as "punishment."1 66 Even those
governments that did support the retention of Article 19 did not advocate a
regime of criminal responsibility and punishment of states.167
If it had any purpose at all, the labeling of "international crimes" was thus
mostly symbolic, emphasizing the "specially dangerous character of the
delinquency."l68 It was this exact symbolism that troubled Crawford:
[T]o the extent it is intended to reflect a "criminalization" of the state (akin to
the international criminalization of individuals before the Yugoslav or Rwanda
Tribunals, or the de facto criminalization of Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia in
161. Draft Articles, supra note 121, art. 19. For a detailed historical account and the debates
surrounding Article 19, see INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC's
DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Joseph Weiler, Antonio Cassese & Maria Spinedi eds.,
1989).
162. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 465 (1948).
163. James Crawford, First Report on State Responsibility, 1143, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.1
(1998) [hereinafter Crawford, First Report].
164. Id. 1146-48.
165. See Geoff Gilbert, The Criminal Responsibility of States, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 345, 366-
67 (1990) ("Academics can generalise about[,] and Article 19 can even attempt to create international
crimes, but until breach thereof gives rise to different forms of liability it adds nothing to the
development of any new trend in State responsibility.").
166. Derek William Bowett, Crimes of State and the 1996 Report of the International Law
Commission on State Responsibility, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 163, 171-72 (1998); see also Special Rapporteur,
Seventh Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/469 (May 9, May 24, May 29, 1995)
(prepared by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz), reprinted in [1995] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 44, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER/A/1 995/Add. 1 (Part 2).
167. Crawford, First Report, supra note 163, at 9.
168. GRIGORII IVANOVICH TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 404 (William E. Butler
trans., 1974).
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recent practice), then issues of structure and organization, of due process and
dispute settlement clearly must be addressed. Otherwise, the language of
"crime" degenerates into name-calling, and will tend only to accentuate the
power of the powerful, and especially of the Permanent Members of the
Security Council, acting as such or in their considerable individual
capacities.
Article 19 was ultimately replaced in the 2001 Draft with the more benign
term "Serious Breaches of Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General
International Law." The consequences of "serious breaches" remained as they
were for "international crimes." Nonetheless, the change could not be
dismissed as merely rhetorical:
In fact, the connotations conveyed by words have profound repercussions,
which explains the mistrust displayed towards "crime"-that "troublesome
word"-especially in political circles. Since Dostoevsky, it has been a tough
task to dissociate crime and punishment[.]17 0
Joseph Weiler has gone even further in rejecting the possibility that the
debate over Article 19 was either cosmetic or semantic, locating it, instead, in
the wider controversy over the real purpose of the U.N. system. Supporters of
the concept of international crimes, according to Weiler, sought to rely on it as
a natural law paradigm that could prevail over the U.N. system, with which
they were disillusioned, while objectors believed that any attempt to bypass that
system was dangerous and illegitimate.' 71
Jettisoning the concept of "international crimes" and replacing it with
"serious breaches" does not, of course, resolve the debate, even if it exemplifies
the symbolic preference for peace and the aversion to what Crawford termed
"name-calling" or, more generally, blaming. The elimination of "international
crimes" from the 2001 Draft Articles did not suppress intuitions about the
criminal responsibility of states, in scholarship or politics. In June 2010, U.S.
officials were quoted as referring to North Korea as "a criminal state"
following allegations that North Korea was stealing South Korean television
signals of World Cup Soccer matches. 72 A few months earlier, Iranian leader
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the United States itself of being "a criminal
state" for supporting Israel.173 Crawford himself, in his remarks above, referred
to "the de facto criminalization of Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia;" and, after
having decided to make away with the concept of "international crimes" in the
169. James Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
435, 443 (1999) [hereinafter Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles]; see also JORGENSEN, supra note 6,
at 183 (claiming that the resistance to "international crimes" arose from "the penal implications of the
term" and the stigma attached to it).
170. Eric Wyler, From 'State Crime' to Responsibility for 'Serious Breaches of Obligations
Under Peremptory Norms of General International Law,' 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1147, 1160 (2002).
171. Joseph H.H. Weiler, On Prophets and Judges, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES,
supra note 161, at 319, 328-29.
172. See US Calls NKorea a "Criminal State," FOX NEWS, June 15, 2010,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/06/15/calls-nkorea-criminal-state.
173. Iran Leader Vows to "Cut the Hands" of Enemies, ALARABIYA.NET, Feb. 23, 2010,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/02/24/101367.html.
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Draft Articles, nonetheless stated that his decision should not rule out the future
development of state criminal responsibility.174
2. Punitive Damages
For centuries, punitive damages were a common type of reparation for
internationally wrongful acts, especially following wars. Under Just War
doctrine, victorious sovereigns were allowed to exact payment in money and
kind from their defeated adversaries as part of the jus victoriae.175 Postwar
reparations were not to assume a vindictive mode or be odious and it was
important that they be exacted in moderation so as to allow for the restoration
of peaceful relations following the war. Nonetheless, for wars to effectively
restore peace there was a need to deter those who sought to destabilize the
international order. Reparations, therefore, even if not vengeful, still had to
reflect the interest in both specific and general deterrence, allowing for harsher
treatment of the vanquished than a compensatory interest alone would. 77
Deterrence also allowed for some differentiation in the treatment of different
defeated parties: barbarians were subject to harsher treatment, according to
conventional wisdom at the time that a gentler form of reparation was likely to
prove ineffectual if applied to them.178
The claim that post-conflict reparations should not assume a form of
punishment was reiterated by a number of writers, most of them French, during
the nineteenth century.' 79  In the background were two post-conflict
settlements-the 1815 Treaty of Paris following the defeat of Napoleon
Bonaparte so and the 1871 Treaty of Frankfurt concluding the Franco-Prussian
war 18-both imposing considerable monetary sanctions on defeated France.
Even more consequential than the monetary reparations was the 1871 Treaty's
ceding of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. It was not just the French who viewed
this transfer of territory to Germany as punitive; Germans, too, were divided as
to the potential hazardous effects of this arrangement on the future of German-
French relations. I82
174. Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles, supra note 169, at 443.
175. See, e.g., Allen S. Weiner, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 245 (2007) (reviewing
STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY (2005)) ("'[A] prominent role
was played by one of the components of traditional just-war doctrine' in the imposition of reparations on
Germany .... (quoting NEFF, supra, at 287)).
176. See Carsten Stahn, 'Jus Ad Bellum', 'Jus In Bello'... 'Jus Post Bellum'?-Rethinking the
Conception of the Law of Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 921, 939-40 (2006) ("[D]evelopments in
international law point to the emergence of a rule that prohibits indiscriminate punishment of a people
through excessive reparation . . . .").
177. Blane & Kingsubry, supra note 38, at 260-62.
178. Id.at261.
179. Neff, supra note 41, at 84.
180. Treaty of Paris art. 4, Nov. 20, 1815, 65 Consol. T.S. 251, 304. War indemnity was set at
seven hundred million francs.
181. Treaty of Frankfurt, May 10, 1871, 143 Consol. T.S. 164. German occupation was to
continue until the war indemnity was paid in full.
182. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was among the most vociferous opponents of the
arrangement.
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More than the Treaty of Frankfurt, however, it was the Treaty of
Versailles at the close of World War I that was to become a symbol of the
possible uses and abuses of punitive damages. The Treaty ordered the
arraignment of the defeated Kaiser, Wilhelm II, for "a supreme offence against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties," before a representative
tribunal of the victorious allies. While channeling criminal liability to the
political leader, other Treaty clauses reflected the perceived guilt of the nation
in its entirety. The so-called "War Guilt clauses" affirmed Germany's
responsibility for the war and its losses, and required it to pay reparations on
that basis.184 In a countermove to the Treaty of Frankfurt, large parts of
German territory along with their inhabitants were transferred to other
countries, mostly to the re-established Polish state, as well as to
Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, and Denmark."'
The initial amount of reparations was set by the Inter-Allied Reparations
Commission at 269 billion gold marks (about thirty-two billion U.S. dollars).
Notwithstanding subsequent debates over whether the original sum was
punitive or merely compensatory (considering the vast damages the war had
inflicted), 18 at the time it was widely viewed as punitive. Among those
condemning it as prohibitively high was the principal representative of the
British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference and subsequent Nobel Laureate,
John Maynard Keynes, who resigned in protest from the Treasury.'8 The sum
was reduced under the 1924 Dawes Plan, and the 1932 Lausanne Treaty sought
to eliminate it altogether. With the rise of Adolf Hitler to power in 1933, the
question of reparations became moot. By then, Germany had paid only one
eighth of its debt.189
Toward the close of World War II, the initially envisioned Morgenthau
Plan for postwar Germany sought to avoid a staggered payment system like the
one conceived by the Versailles Treaty, which was considered unreliable and
183. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 50, art. 227.
184. Id. arts. 231-247.
185. Id. arts. 27-115.
186. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: "The War to End All Wars" and the Birth of a
Handicapped International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 244, 256 (2002);
James Nicholas Boeving, OTE: Aggression, International Law, and the ICC: An Argument for the
Withdrawal ofAggression from the Rome Statute, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 557, 605-06 (2005).
187. See, e.g., Detlev Vagts, Book Review, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 517, 518 (1987) (reviewing
FARHAD MALEKIAN, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES (1985)) ("The examples
since the turn of the century in which reparations have been imposed upon a state, in particular those
imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, have clearly demonstrated that
the punitive compensatory measures imposed by the victorious upon the defeated could not have been
deterring... .").
188. See generally DONALD MARKWELL, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: ECONOMIC PATHS TO WAR AND PEACE 54 (2006) (noting Keynes's belief that reparations
should be kept "within Germany's moral obligation and capacity to pay").
189. West Germany undertook to make further payments on its Versailles debt in 1953 and,
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unified Germany continued all payments with interest. The last
installment was on October 3, 2010. See Olivia Lang, Why Has Germany Taken So Long To Pay OffIts
WWI Debt?, BBCNEWS, Oct. 2, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-l 1442892. -
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reversible. In a section dedicated to "Restitution and Reparation,"' 90 the Plan
ordered the transfer of German land, resources, and dismantled industries to
invaded countries, the confiscation of all German assets outside of Germany,
and forced German labor outside of Germany.191 In early 1947, four million
German soldiers were still serving as forced laborers in the United Kingdom,
France, and the Soviet Union.19 2 All of these forms of reparations were
eliminated under the subsequent Marshall Plan, which substituted a vision of
reconstruction for the punitive Morgenthau Plan.
Outside the context of war, punitive damages were also ordered in the
settlement of a variety of international disputes throughout the twentieth
century. In the I'm Alone case, the United States was ordered to pay $25,000 in
reparation to Canada for having sunk a Canadian vessel; the award was linked
to the indignity suffered by Canada and not to the material value of the boat or
its cargo. 93 In the Janes case,194 Mexico was ordered to pay $12,000 to the
United States for having failed to apprehend the murderers of an American
citizen. In the Rainbow Warrior arbitration, France was ordered to pay New
Zealand thirteen million N.Z. dollars in compensation for the "public
outrage"l95 committed on its territory by French agents who blew up a
Greenpeace vessel mooring in the Auckland harbor. In all these cases, the
damages were understood to include a punitive element.' 96 Furthermore, the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, established in 1981 in conjunction with the
resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, explicitly included punitive damages in
its awards.197
Building on this practice, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
reparation section of the ILC's Draft Articles permitted, alongside restitution or
compensation, some elements of punitive damages within the concept of
190. Program To Prevent Germany from Starting a World War Ill, reprinted in HENRY
MORGENTHAU, JR., GERMANY IS OUR PROBLEM: A PLAN FOR GERMANY, at v (1945).
191. Id.
192. JOHN DIETRICH, THE MORGENTHAU PLAN: SOVIET INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN POSTWAR
POLICY 123 (2002).
193. S.S. "I'm Alone" (Can./U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A., 1609, 1618 (Can.-U.S. 1935). Note, however,
that the case came under criticism as the commissioners that awarded the damages judged the case ex
aequo et bono and not under strictly legal terms. See PHILIPP WENDEL, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 190, 191 (2007).
194. Laura. M.B. Janes et al. (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 82, 90 (U.S.-Mex.
1925).
195. Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z./Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 215, 267 (N.Z.-Fr. 1990). The explosion
killed a photographer on board the ship.
196. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 533 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992); JORGENSEN, supra note 6, at 188-89, 200-01 (2003) (claiming that although the tribunal in the
Janes case did not explicitly label the award as punitive, such purpose can be inferred).
197. In a concurring opinion at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Judge Brower stated
that "punitive or exemplary damages might be sought" in that tribunal "for unlawful expropriation, for
otherwise the injured party would get only what it would have gotten by lawful expropriation and would
receive nothing additional for the enhanced wrong done and the offending state would experience no
disincentive for the repetition of the unlawful conduct." Sedco, Inc. v. NIOC, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
180, 205 (1986) (Brower, J., concurring).
2013] 89
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
satisfaction.198 Reviewing the "crucial question" of "whether satisfaction is
punitive or afflictive, or compensatory in nature,"199 Special Rapporteur
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz concluded in 1989 that "[tihe predominantly afflictive
and not compensatory role of satisfaction is . . . widely recognized and
indisputably emphasized by long-standing diplomatic practice."200 Implicitly
evoking the notion of retribution, he also determined that "[r]elated to the idea
of its afflictive or punitive nature is the idea that satisfaction should be
proportioned to the seriousness of the offence or to the degree of fault of the
responsible State." 201
Notwithstanding Arangio-Ruiz's thorough analysis, many scholars
disagree with his conclusions on both positive and normative grounds. Some
have questioned his analysis of the case law itself, arguing that the available
body of jurisprudence does not demonstrate the acceptability of punitive
damages.202 Others have contended that the notion of punitive damages was
incompatible with the concept of reparations, which was in itself, they argued,
grounded in a non-penal civil law paradigm. 203
By the time the final version of the Draft Articles was approved in 2001,
these dissenting voices had overcome those favoring punitive damages. The
term "punitive damages" was replaced by the phrase, "damages reflecting the
gravity of the infringement," 204 and the Commentary on the 2001 Draft made it
clear that no concept of punishment or punitive damages was now recognized
with regard to states, thereby rejecting any and all suggestions to recognize
198. See Second Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/425, at 56 (June 9, June 22,
1989) (prepared by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz), reprinted in [1989] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n iii, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4.425; Stephan Wittich, Awe of the Gods and Fear of the Priests: Punitive Damages and the Law
of State Responsibility, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 101 (1998).
199. Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 198, at 32.
200. Id. at 40.
201. Id. at 33. He does, however, later qualify the concept of punitive damages by noting that
the "punishment" is not imposed by an outside party, but rather depends on the volition of the offending
state itself:
Although the demand for satisfaction will normally come-unless felicitously preceded
by the offending State's own initiative-from the injured State, the satisfaction to be
given consists of actions to be taken by the offender itself. There is no need to fear,
therefore, that satisfaction will entail the notion of a sanction applied by one State against
another, and thus constitute a serious encroachment upon the offending State's sovereign
equality. In the measure, surely relative, in which one can speak of a sanction, it is not so
much a question of a sanction inflicted upon the offending State. It is rather a matter of
atonement, of a "self-inflicted" sanction, intended to cancel, by deeds of the offender
itself, the moral, political and/or juridical injury suffered by the offended State.
Id. at 42.
202. Wittich, supra note 198, at 118-31; see also Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Indemnity,
1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13) where the Permanent Court of International Justice
proclaimed the purpose of international reparations to be to "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed." The PCIJ named restitution in kind or compensatory damages as the primary modes of
reparation and kept silent about punitive damages. See also the Lusitania cases, in which Umpire Parker
declared that injury was subject to reparation but not as a penalty. Lusitania (U.S./Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 32,
35 (U.S.-Ger. 1923), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_VII/32-44.pdf. But see I
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 196, at 533 (claiming that punitive damages are part of
international law).
203. See Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 198, at 32 nn.257-60.
204. Wittich, supra note 198, at 152.
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mild forms of such damages.205 Even the more traditional use of the remedy of
satisfaction-namely, acknowledgment of injury and public apology-was
discouraged by the drafters of the 2001 version, as it has been used in the past
206in a punitive manner.
The reluctance to award punitive damages against states has not been
confined to claims brought by states. Human rights tribunals have generally
been disinclined to award aggravated or exemplary damages to individuals
bringing claims against states for violations of human rights,207 thereby leaving
claimants with a more limited recourse to remedies.
Nonetheless, according to some commentators, punitive damages have
not been altogether eliminated in practice, but only hidden under a purportedly
compensatory scheme.208 Testing this proposition empirically is likely to prove
impossible, as the line between compensatory and punitive damages, especially
where the former are aggravated to reflect the seriousness of the offense, is
difficult to draw.209 For instance, the United Nations Compensation
Commission established after the 1991 Gulf War allowed claims to be made for
moral damages, enabling the Commission to award high damages even without
acknowledging their punitive character.210 Moreover, in at least one human
rights litigation,211 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights awarded
compensation for non-pecuniary damages, in a step view[ed] by some
observers as a move toward "recognition that full reparation in some cases
involved not only compensation but punishment." 2 12
The questions then remain why it is that the ILC sought to eliminate
punitive damages from the realm of acceptable forms of reparations, and why it
is that even if awarded indirectly in practice, tribunals are hesitant to give any
formal recognition to the punitive character of reparations awarded.
3. Countermeasures
The Draft Articles initially did not include the term "countermeasures."
Instead, the ILC's Special Rapporteur, Roberto Ago, proposed Draft Article 30,
205. Report of the International Law Comm'n 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 pt. 2 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, at
99, 107, 111; see also Stephan Wittich, Punitive Damages, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 667 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
206. Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 833, 838 (2002).
207. HELMUT KOZIOL & VANESSA WILCOX, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL
LAW PERSPECTIVES 24 (2009) (noting that punitive damages are not at all awardable under the European
Convention on Human Rights); DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
360 (2005).
208. See, e.g., THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND NOTES 745 (H.W. Briggs ed.,
2d ed. 1953) (arguing that many awards contain a strong punitive element, even if that element is usually
covert).
209. JORGENSEN, supra note 6, at 201.
210. Id. at 195.
211. Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C.) No. 101, 1 301 (15) (Nov. 25, 2003).
212. SHELTON, supra note 207, at 361.
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which permitted a state to apply "a sanction against [another] State, in
consequence of an internationally wrongful act committed by that other
,213State." The ILC subsequently opted to replace the term "sanction" with the
word "measure," entitling the Article "Countermeasures in respect of an
internationally wrongful act." 214
The permissible scope of countermeasures was left undefined, until the
subsequent Rapporteur, James Crawford, published another draft in 1994. In
explaining the effort, Crawford noted,
[T]he approach taken to countermeasures is an instrumental rather than a
punitive one. Countermeasures are measures taken not with a view to the
punishment of the state which committed the internationally wrongful act, but
with a view to ensuring that the state ceases the internationally wrongful act (if
215it is a continuing act) and provides reparation.
Crawford aversion to the term "punishment" might have rested on two
points he then emphasized. One was the ability to reverse the unlawful
behaviour that gave rise to the countermeasure, "leav[ing] questions of
punishment or reprisal to one side." 216 Another was the fact that punishment
must be inflicted by a competent social organ, while countermeasures are
employed by states in vindicating their own (or shared) rights.217
Another set of limitations that Crawford added to permissible
countermeasures, beyond an appropriate motivation by the party employing
them, was a substantive list of prohibited countermeasures. In conformance
with the efforts to ban armed reprisals (under the jus ad bellum) or belligerent
reprisals (under the jus in bello), Draft Article 50 prohibited those
countermeasures involving the threat or use of force according to the principles
of the U.N. Charter, those affecting humanitarian protections, those affecting
fundamental human rights, and those affecting other obligations arising under
peremptory norms of international law.218 Draft Article 50 sparked heated
debates among states and delegates over its necessity, language, and scope. The
ILC commentary explained that countermeasures are necessary in a
"decentralised system by which injured States may seek to vindicate their
,219rights," suggesting that countermeasures are a safety valve that allow states
to enforce their rights while keeping those enforcement efforts at bay.
In his commentary on the Draft Articles, Antoine Ollivier observes, "The
object of countermeasures is strictly limited to ensuring the performance by the
213. Special Rapporteur, Eight Reports on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318 and
Add.1 to 4 (Jan. 24, Feb. 5, June 15, 1979) (prepared by Robert Ago), reprinted in [1979] 2 Y.B. INTL.
L. COMM'N pt. 1, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser. A/1979/Add. I (Part 1).
214. For the commentary on the article, see 2 Y.B. Int'l. L. Comm'n, supra note 205, pt. 2 at
115-22. Ago's proposed title had been "Legitimate application of a sanction."
215. James Crawford, The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures, in UNITED
NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 60-61 (V. Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001) [hereinafter
Crawford, Sanctions and Countermeasures].
216. Id.at6l.
217. Id.
218. Draft Articles, supra note 120, art. 50. The original text in 1994 was slightly modified in
the 2001 draft, but both embodied the same principle.
219. Report ofthe International Law Comm'n, supra note 205, at 128.
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wrongdoing State of its secondary obligations (cessation, reparation), and
cannot include punishment of that State." 220
The central conceptual enterprise of the regime, David Bereman suggests,
was "the search for a polite international society," 221 one that would ultimately
do away with the need for any coercive action.222 For such a polite society,
"measures," in their benign connotation, were a more appropriate term than
"sanctions," even though as a pragmatic matter, nothing else has changed.
III. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE SHIFT FROM PUNISHMENT TO
PREVENTION
The preceding historical account has demonstrated the efforts that have
been made over the past century to eliminate the concept of state crime and
punishment from international law altogether. Far from accidental or stylistic,
these efforts have been a conscious and deliberate association of peace with
prevention, forcing any act of punishment to be disguised as an act of
prevention, even as leaders' statements and public commentary suggested that
punitive urges continued to motivate some coercive action.
In this section, I build on this historical account in imagining what
associated considerations may have served to support the perceived correlation
between a preference for peace and an aversion to punishment. These include:
(a) the concern that state punishment breeds humiliation, revenge, and further
violence; (b) the moral and pragmatic aversion to collective punishment; (c) the
belief that punishment suggests some normative superiority of the punisher
over the punished, which might undermine the basic organizing principle of the
international system, namely sovereign equality; and (d) the fear that in a
system that lacks the institutional mechanisms for adjudication and
enforcement, a paradigm of punishment would lend itself too easily to power
politics.
While each of these considerations has some explanatory force, when
testing them against the existing practice of coercion-as-prevention, none, I
argue, is sufficiently convincing to eradicate the notion of state punishment
altogether.
A. Revenge and Violence
The term punishment, especially if understood as retribution, runs the risk
of blurring the lines between legitimate vindication and visceral revenge.223
Vengeance, by nature, risks being disproportionate to legitimate punishment,
220. Antoine Ollivier, International Criminal Responsibility of the State, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 703, 707 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
221. David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 819
(2002).
222. Id. at 831 ("The countermeasure clauses... feature a profound impulse toward social
engineering for international relations. In this respect, the articles are forward-looking, imagining a time
in international life when unilateral and horizontal means of enforcement through robust self-help will
be a thing of the past.").
223. See Luban, supra note 9, at 318-25.
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and then quickly invites retaliatory vengeance. A conception of state
punishment may have been appropriate in a religious age, where punishment
was inflicted by God, whether directly or through intermediaries, or where the
sovereign, personifying the state, sought to protect his or her honor. It has no
place, however, in an enlightened, secularized international system, which
envisions the creation of a solidarist, polite international society. 2 24
Moreover, the concept of punishment suggests a relationship of
domination and submission and invites a world order divided into "friends" and
"foes." Punishment places the punished outside civilized community. And once
outside civilized community, they may be subject to the infliction of unlimited
and indiscriminate violence. If, to borrow from Martti Koskenniemi,
international law is the gentle civilizer of nations,2 2 5 punishment is neither
gentle nor necessarily civilized. In an anarchic system that is constantly on the
verge or beyond the verge of violence, punishment that harbors revenge is an
especially perilous paradigm.226
Indeed, the historical experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries lends support to the fear of punishment-as-revenge and counter-
revenge. According to some accounts, the 1871 loss of Alsace-Lorraine in the
Franco-Prussian War did polarize French policies toward Germany for the next
forty years, as was initially feared by some Germans. Reconquering the "lost
provinces" became a French obsession, generating revanchism which strongly
pushed France to join World War I,227 and eventually win back the territories
under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.
The longer-term political consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, and
especially its War Guilt Clauses, were feared even as the Treaty was being
negotiated. Harold Nicolson, a British delegate at Versailles, declared the
Treaty "neither just nor wise," and proclaimed that "future historians will come
to the conclusion that we were very stupid men." 228In his recollection of the
signing ceremony he recounted, "we kept our seats while the Germans were
conducted like prisoners from the dock, their eyes still fixed upon some distant
point of the horizon." 229 The Treaty seemed to be the exact kind of postwar
punishment that Gentili, Grotius, and their contemporaries had cautioned
224. Andrew Hurrell, Conclusion: International Law and the Changing Constitution of
International Society, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 327, 336 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) (advancing the term
"solidarist" international society); see also Bederman, supra note 221 (discussing the effort to create a
"polite" international society).
225. MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2004).
226. See Blane & Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 242 ("But giving punishment as a justification
for forcible measures against states or peoples is nowadays so rare in international legal discourse, that
any claim to act on the basis of such a justification, certainly to contemplate the use of force for such
reasons of punishment, would strike a sharply discordant note. This reflects the general orientation of
international law thinkers toward de-escalation of violence and the institutionalization of peace.").
227. See, e.g., Mark Hewitson, Germany and France Before the First World War: A
Reassessment of Wilhelmine Foreign Policy, 115 ENG. HIST. REv. 570, 598 (2000).
228. HAROLD NICOLSON, PEACEMAKING 1919: BEING REMINISCENCES OF THE PARIS PEACE
CONFERENCE 186 (1933).
229. Id. at 369.
94 [Vol. 38: 57
The Crime and Punishment ofStates
against; the kind that inhibited the restoration of longer-term peace and
stability, and which sought to restructure the preexisting order instead of
merely restoring it at the close of hostilities. With multitudes of humiliated
Germans turning to extreme nationalism and to a leadership that promised to
restore their pride and honor less than two decades later, the Treaty became a
lesson against the politics of victors' justice. 230 A further cautionary note was
struck when, after the League of Nations' one and only experiment with
collective sanctions, Mussolini joined Hitler,2 3 1 and World War II was neither
prevented nor mitigated.
The United States initially paid these concerns no heed when it came to
determine Germany's post-World War II fate. The 1945 Morgenthau Plan for
postwar Germany deemed Versailles inadequate, not because it was punitive,
but because it was not punitive enough. Through occupation and partition, the
Plan sought to "convert Germany into a country primarily agricultural and
pastoral in its character." 232  Alongside complete demilitarization, the
Morgenthau Plan, promulgated as Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067,
sought an "industrial disarmament" and economic stagnation, ensuring that the
German standard of living was no higher than in any of its neighbor states and
equal to what it was during the Great Depression. 233 The justification offered
by JCS 1067 was the following:
It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany's ruthless warfare and
the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made
chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape
responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves. 2 3 4
Soon, however, it became apparent that the punitive Morgenthau Plan
would be detrimental to the Western Allies' own interests: even before the war
ended, the leaked plan served Germany's Propaganda Minister, Joseph
Goebbels, in his efforts to muster German resistance on the western front.235
After the war, economic depression in Germany hindered the entire
reconstruction of free Europe and threatened to drive Western-occupied and
dishonored Germany to Communism. In June 1947, the Morgenthau Plan was
substituted by the Marshall Plan, which sought to rebuild Germany-and by
extension, Western Europe-as quickly and effectively as possible.236 Any
230. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. SHIRER, RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI
GERMANY 142 (1990).
231. See supra note 137.
232. HENRY L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 577
(1948), quoted in Wolfgang Schlauch, American Policy Towards Germany, 1945, 5 J. CONTEMP. HIST.
113, 115 (1970).
233. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067, reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
GERMANY 1947-1949: THE STORY IN DOCUMENTS 22-28 (1950), http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org
/pdfleng/Allied%20Policies%205%20ENG.pdf.
234. Id. art 4.
235. See JOHN DIETRICH, THE MORGENTHAU PLAN: SOVIET INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN
POSTWAR POLICY 70-71 (2002) ("German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels did not waste time
capitalizing on the news of the Morgenthau Plan .... .").
236. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1947-1952, at 29, 427 (1987).
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retribution to be had was channeled into trying and punishing individual
German (and Japanese) leaders. The German nation, "guilty" as it may have
been, was to be spared.
With peace becoming the paramount interest of the postwar world order,
punishment that threatens humiliation, revenge, and further violence would
have no place in justifying the use of interstate force; it would never be
employed to account for the conduct of war, and there could be no mention of it
in decisions to impose unilateral or collective sanctions. The fear of the
consequences of punishment of humiliating a fellow state also featured in the
much later ILC's decisions to do away with the concept of international crimes
(with Crawford's cautioning against "name-calling" 237) and with punitive
reparations, as well as to rename "sanctions" as "countermeasures." Recall that
the desire to avoid any appearance of shame or disgrace was so strong that the
Draft Articles made it clear that even apologies or the promise of non-repetition
of the violation, both traditional forms of "satisfaction,". "may not take a form
humiliating the responsible State." 238
Even in the most egregious of contemporary cases, as when the ICJ found
Serbia responsible for not stopping the genocide in the Bosnian town of
Srebrenica (and indirectly, for the first time, determined that a state could be
held liable for the crime of genocide 2 39), the court was reluctant to impose any
form of punishment on the Serbian state itself. Instead, it ordered Serbia to
punish or transfer individuals accused of genocide to trial by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Finding that monetary
compensation or the guarantee of non-repetition were not appropriate remedies
for this type of a case, the Court nonetheless concluded that bringing several
identifiable individuals to trial would "constitute appropriate satisfaction." 240
Unlike punishment, the rhetoric of prevention appears to promise a
pragmatic debate, which can mask deep value divisions. As Dan Kahan has
shown in the domestic sphere, people often justify their positions on
punishment or regulation (death penalty, gun control, etc.) in consequentialist
terms, e.g., deterring and frustrating future crime. They persist in invoking such
justifications even when they are presented with empirical evidence that refutes
the consequential assessment.241 Kahan argues that this phenomenon is best
explained by the wish to avoid a head-on clash over morals and values that
must occur if debates are to take a deontological, moralist angle.242 By using
the language of threat rather than guilt, the international community can
237. Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles, supra note 169, at 443.
238. Draft Articles, supra note 120, art. 37(3).
239. For an excellent historical account of the debates around state responsibility for genocide
and a critique of the ICJ's decision, see Saira Mohamed, A Neglected Option: The Contributions ofState
Responsibility for Genocide to Transitional Justice, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. 327 (2009). Mohamed also
notes that even this very tame decision was criticized as a "dangerous step towards energizing the
concept of collective guilt." Id. at 350.
240. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91,1464 (Feb. 26).
241. Dan Kahan, The Secret Ambition ofDeterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999).
242. Id. at 418.
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similarly avoid the assigning of moral blame or engaging in name-calling, and
remain within an ostensibly more neutral and pragmatic frame of prevention.
That seemingly neutral frame of prevention thus promises to act as a
balancing formula between securing countries' rights and protections while
avoiding cycles of spiraling violence. While revenge can never lead to peace,
the morally benign nature of prevention, under current logic, is more likely to.
In an imperfect analogy, the avoidance of punishment allows a greater focus on
the "rehabilitation" of the offending state, bringing it back into compliance and
into the "community of states." To the extent retribution is a necessary
component in the healing of the injured party, it can be achieved, so it is
believed, through the prosecution of individuals.
The instrumental logic of the aversion to punishment-fearing it will
breed more revenge and violence-is questionable, however. For one thing, not
all cases of in-conflict or post-conflict punishment have led to cycles of
revenge and hostility. While unilaterally imposed sanctions sometimes bred
more violence, Japan, which suffered the most notorious form of injury in
modem history, adopted an explicitly peaceful attitude to foreign relations in its
constitution and subsequent foreign affairs.
Additionally, while it is possible that punishment breeds sentiments of
humiliation and an urge for revenge-because of both its potentially over-harsh
disciplinary character and its connotation of moral blame-it is unclear that the
rhetorical disguise of prevention has different effects. A sense of humiliation
following punishment may be replaced by a sense of injustice or helplessness in
the face of coercive prevention, neither of which is necessarily more conducive
to international peace and security. Populations of countries that are subject to
sanctions may view such sanctions as harmful and unfair, even if they
understand or agree with the motivations behind them. The population of North
Korea, for instance, may have no more sympathy for Kim Jong-II than does the
UNSC, and yet may resent the UNSC for further burdening it, albeit indirectly,
by imposing sanctions on the North Korean regime.
In addition, whether the channeling of retribution to individual leaders
indeed protects the broader domestic population from a sense of humiliation is
similarly an open question. One may reasonably hold that while the distinction
between leaders and populations is convincing in tyrannical regimes, it is
probably less so where indicted leaders enjoyed broad popular support. If so,
the rationale of avoiding violence and preferring peace may already be
compromised by the project of international criminal law, further weakening its
instrumental logic against the punishment of states.
The broader point here is that the avoidance of humiliation and cycles of
revenge for the purposes of peaceful relations may or may not prove ultimately
beneficial to peace. Trite as the argument may be, this is ultimately an
empirical question. Moreover, if prevention is the operating paradigm of the
system, there may be a constant sense of anxiety about the possibility of being
subjected to "preventive measures" by another state or a group of states. This
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is, in essence, the international relations realists' understanding of the "security
dilemma:" 243 the race to arm and rearm in the face of threats from others.
And finally, to the extent that the fear of revenge and violence rests on the
possible hazards of the expressive power of the paradigm of punishment for
international relations, there is no reason to deny the possibility that this
expressive power may serve positive goals as well; or, for that matter, that
avoiding the paradigm of punishment has no expressive repercussions itself. I
return to the point of what is lost by avoiding the language of punishment later
in this Article.
B. Collective Punishment
Clearly, any punishment of the "state" would necessarily result in
collective harm to its population. Could such collective punishment ever be
justified, or is it only the harm that is inflicted in the course of prevention
efforts that could be? Present-day leaders take care to emphasize that their
actions are not intended as collective punishment, even as they do inflict
collective harm. NATO's 1999 statement on Kosovo clearly singled out
Milogevid and his regime as the target of its operation and insisted that it was
never meant as a collective punishment on the people of Serbia. 2 44 President
Bush repeatedly distinguished Afghans from Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Iraqis
from Saddam Hussein, and Muslims from terrorists.245 Israeli leaders, too,
insisted that their military strikes in Lebanon ended up harming innocent
Lebanese only because the latter were effectively held hostage by Hezbollah
and were the inadvertent victims of otherwise legitimate operations.246
NATO's recent operation in Libya was justified as protecting the Libyans from
their tyrannical government. 247 It is the same sensitivity to claims about
collective punishment that has driven countries and organizations to attempt to
243. Charles L. Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited, 50 WORLD POL. 171 (1997); Robert
Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 169 (1978).
244. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Statement on Kosovo Issued by the Heads of
State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.,
3, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/officialtexts_27441.htm?selectedLocale=en (last updated Sept.
25, 2009) [hereinafter Statement on Kosovo] ("Our military actions are directed not at the Serb people
but at the policies of the regime in Belgrade . . . .").
245. See, e.g., Edward Cody & Molly Moore, Bomb Kills Four Afghan Civilians; Aid Officials
Urge Greater Care After Accidental Hit at Land-Mine Office, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2001, at A14
(discussing the "Bush administration's pledge that U.S.-led attacks would target Taliban government
and military infrastructure, along with bin Laden's training camps and headquarters, [but] spare the
Afghan people further suffering").
246. See, e.g., Joel Greenberg, Rights Group Accuses Israel of War Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
24, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-08-24/news/0608240171_1_hezbollah-civilians-as-human
-shields-lebanon ("An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman rejected the findings asserting that the sites
struck in Lebanon were legitimate military targets under international law because they were used by
Hezbollah guerrillas who operated from civilian areas and who, he said, used civilians as human
shields.").
247. S.C. Res. 1973 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (noting "the responsibility of the
Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population" before authorizing a no-fly zone and arms
embargo).
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devise "smart sanctions" that would target leaders and regimes while
minimizing collateral harm to citizens.
In this section I trace two possible objections to the state punishment
paradigm on the grounds that it constitutes collective punishment-first, that
the regime offends basic liberal notions of justice, namely, individual
responsibility; and second, that collective punishment is pragmatically
dangerous, especially given the goal of peace and security in international
relations.
Indeed, few concepts evoke such powerful negative intuitions as
"collective punishment." 248 Lessons from Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and
other tyrannical and colonialist regimes over the length and breadth of history
have joined the ever-growing liberal celebration of individual autonomy to ban
all forms of collective punishment under both domestic and international law.
Once the unified entity comprising the state, sovereign, and people
disintegrated, collective punishment against the innocent lost much of its moral
and political justification and instead became synonymous with that which was
evil, vindictive, and purposelessly harmful. Accordingly, present-day
international law sanctifies the principles of individual accountability and
responsibility, limiting both the responsibility of individuals to acts of others as
well as the responsibility of the state to acts of its individual citizens.249
Moreover, collective harm in the form of reprisals or punishments in war
has been feared for its potentially counterproductive pragmatic implications,
not only for its immorality or injustice. Indeed, it was pragmatics, rather than
morality, that ultimately brought the United States to forego the Morgenthau
Plan's punitive scheme and opt for reconstruction: under the initially conceived
plan, there was no-and there could be no-distinction between the state and
its people. Recall JCS 1067, which held the entire German people responsible
for the war. The plan even included a "nonfraternization" policy, under which
American servicemen were not to engage in any normal intercourse with
Germans, including by shaking hands, visiting private homes, playing games,
or conversing or arguing with them. German churches were segregated and
American worshipers were to confine themselves to Americans-only pews. The
army newspaper Stars and Stripes ran many anti-fraternization slogans and
statements, such as: "Don't fraternize. If in a German town you bow to a pretty
girl or pat a blond child ... you bow to Hitler and his reign of blood." 2 50 More
than a thousand Americans were arrested by the Military Police for violating
248. See, e.g., Irwin Lipnowski, A Partial Rehabilitation of the Principle of Collective
Punishment, 8 CAN. J. L. & SOC'Y 121, 121 (1993) (noting that "the principle of collective punishment
is not one that commands much respect in either moral philosophy circles or the legal community" and
that "the principle of collective punishment has met with universal rejection and condemnation in all
liberal democratic states").
249. For a discussion of the optimal allocation between individual and state responsibility, see
Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under
International Law, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 72 (2007).
250. EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GERMANY: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
AMERICAN OCCUPATION 54 (1959).
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these orders. 251 However, the non-fraternization policy, along with the other
punitive elements of the Morgenthau Plan, was forgone under the Marshall
Plan. It was not so much Karl Jasper's moral cry for a distinction between the
legal guilt, the political guilt, and the metaphysical guilt of the German nation
that had won the day.252 It was, rather, a strategic interest in rebuilding
Germany and a fear that collective penalties would promote a cohesive
opposition to the Allies' occupation, driving Germans to the arms of the Soviet
Union.
Nonetheless, the doctrinal commitment to the prohibition on collective
punishment is only near-absolute, with some notable exceptions, such as
criminal corporate responsibility or conspiracy crimes. Moreover, while
doctrine has followed a general ban on collective punishment, academic
scholarship is rife with debates over the moral and pragmatic justifications for
the ban and its exceptions. 253 Alongside the individualistic commitment of
present-day international and domestic law, there are those who believe that
dividing and segregating responsibility where the act is collective by its very
nature is no less immoral than holding the innocent guilty. 2 54
This notion of collective responsibility, especially where there is freedom
of action, is often invoked as a critique of the project of international criminal
law: indicting and punishing individuals for actions that clearly required a
collective enterprise, or in other words, allowing the state to avoid the
"conspiracy-like character" of its actions that had set the background for the
individual conduct.255 By punishing the individual, the collective cleanses itself
from its own responsibility and rewrites its own biography. Even in terms of its
expressive functions, international criminal law's aversion to collective
punishment might hinder a sense of justice and closure for victims, whose
attackers were ultimately a collective, much more than several individuals.
In the case of democracies, especially, there is reason to suggest that the
collective citizenry is responsible for its leadership's actions. Michael Walzer
cites with agreement J. Glenn Clay, who argued that "[t]he greater the
possibility of free action in the communal sphere, the greater the degree of guilt
for evil deeds done in the name of everyone." 256 Walzer himself is hesitant to
251. Id. at 55.
252. See George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem
of Collective Guilt, Ill YALE L.J. 1499, 1530 (2002).
253. See generally CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE
AGE (1996); Fletcher, supra note 252; John Hasnas, The Centenary ofa Mistake: One Hundred Years of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1329, 1340 (2009); Daryl Levinson, Collective
Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 370, 398 (2003).
254. See, e.g., KUTZ, supra note 253, at 270; Fletcher, supra note 252, at 1543.
255. LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 146 (2005); see
MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); Martti Koskenniemi,
Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 15 (2002); cf HANNAH ARENDT,
EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 276 (1963) (conceding that it is society
that made it "well-nigh impossible for [the perpetrator] to know or feel that he is doing wrong," but
stopping short of advocating collective punishment of societies).
256. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 298 (1975).
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state exactly under what circumstances he would be willing to consider an
entire society collectively "guilty," but he suggests that such circumstances
could exist.2 5 7 If we are to take the concept of popular sovereignty seriously-
and be true to the view that democracy legitimates political rule by putting the
people in authority-then it quickly become questionable why we cannot also
hold the people accountable for their representatives' actions.
Others have pointed out that collective sanctions permeate our legal and
social norms, leaving no place for a uniform objection to their employment.258
Beyond moral questions, those more tolerant of collective punishment also note
its instrumental benefits: A group is often better positioned to police itself than
any external force; 25 9 and groups are better able to make reparations than any
individual and have a harder time escaping judgment.
It may be that much of the aversion to collective punishment is fueled by
past images of mass murder, torture, and other forms of indiscriminate and
arbitrary violence. 26 0 Indeed, even though the legal prohibition is articulated in
much broader terms, the historical precedents that were feared often involved
such wide-scale atrocities. Such was the case with Osama Bin Laden's
proclaimed justification for the September 11th attacks:
The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government
and that they voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and
provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that
the American Congress is a committee that represents the people, the fact that it
agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its
entirety is responsible for the atrocities that it is committing against Muslims. 2 6 1
But there is no necessary correlation between the idea of punishment and
indiscriminate atrocities. Punishment, instead, could be inflicted through a
much milder action, such as punitive damages, trade boycotts, cessation of air
or sea traffic, suspension of participation in international organizations or world
summits, etc. Some scholars who support the resurrection of states' punishment
have suggested even possible dissolution as a punitive measure.262
All of these forms of punishment (but for dissolution) have some
precedent in the practice of "preventive measures," with equally harmful
collective impact.263 Such collective harm is often inflicted even where there is
257. Id. at 302-03.
258. Levinson, supra note 253, at 359-60.
259. Id.
260. Montesquieu, criticizing earlier theorists who advocated reprisals against the people of the
vanquished party, nonetheless believed in the conceptual ability to punish the state without punishing its
individual people: "[F]rom the destruction of the state it does not at all follow that the people who
compose it ought to be also destroyed. The state is the association of men, and not the men themselves;
the citizen may perish, and the man remain." I BARON DE MONTESQUIEU (BARON DE), THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS 135 (Thomas Nugent trans., The Colonial Press, 1900) (1750).
261. MESSAGES TO THE WORLD: THE STATEMENTS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN 140-41 (Bruce
Lawrence ed., James Howarth trans., 2005).
262. Luban, supra note 9, at 327 (citing as punishments "turning over culpable leaders for
criminal trials, or in extreme cases regime change").
263. Most recently, several small states argued that by imposing an embargo on Iranian oil, the
United States and its allies "are not punishing Iran, but us ... the small countries." US Sanctions on Iran
Punishing Small States: Sri Lanka, PRESS TV, Feb. 1, 2012, www.presstv.ir/detail/224334.html.
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a genuine attempt to target only the regime and not the state and its population
as a whole. 2 64 Certainly, nothing inflicts greater collective harm than war itself,
which under present-day international law can be carried out in self-defense. As
Hans Kelsen pointed out:
The sanctions of international law, especially war, it is true, are usually not
interpreted as punishments; but they have nevertheless, in principle, the same
character as the sanctions of criminal law-forcible deprivation of life and
freedom of individuals. ... 265
Even more benignly, collective harm is suffered defacto even when there
are no sanctions or preventive means, but when there are merely compensatory
reparations for a wrong committed by the state under the general rules of state
responsibility. 266 It is ultimately the citizenry, not the abstract entity of the
state, who ultimately pays the compensation. A striking example of this
collective harm was provided by Security Council 687, which established the
United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC).267 Under the UNCC, Iraq
was ordered to pay reparations for all damages incurred by both foreign states
and foreign nationals as a result of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Naturally, it was
the Iraqi population that bore the brunt of these payments.
Moreover, while punishment, under conventional principles, must be
proportionate to the crime, it may be much harder to calibrate the
proportionality of prevention or policing efforts, for how does one know how
much force is really needed in order to prevent some future action? In other
words, punishment may actually be more limited in its adverse collective
effects than its prevention.
264. See Press Release, General Assembly, Delegates Argue Legitimacy of Targeted Sanctions
as Legal Committee Concludes Debate on Special Charter Committee; Crimes by Officials Undermine
Trust in Organizations, Speakers State As They Take Up Criminal Accountability, Need for
International Convention, U.N. Press Release GA/L/3438 (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.un.org/News
/Press/docs/2012/gal3438.doc.htm (reporting arguments that even targeted sanctions harm innocent
people); David Shariatmadari, Sanctions and Dr Strangelove: What if Efforts To Stop the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons Only Made Countries Like Iran and North Korea More Likely To Want Them?,
GUARDIAN (London), July 22, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/22/nuclear
-sanctions-north-korea-iran ("And sanctions, apart from inflicting hardship on the entire population,
directly or indirectly, may also make it slightly easier (though still very difficult) to obtain nuclear
weapons, by enhancing regime control.").
265. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 106 (1949).
266. See, for example, Commissioner Vicuna in In Re Letelier and Moffitt, warning that an
award of disproportionate amount of compensation will result in the de facto punishment of the state's
population, whether or not it is labeled "punitive." Dispute concerning responsibility for the deaths of
Letelier and Moffitt (U.S. v. Chile), 25 R.I.A.A. 1, 15 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1992) (opinion of Vicuna, C.). In
the case of Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez, suggesting that punitive
reparations should be considered, cautioned that such reparations should not be monetary in form, as "it
corresponds more to the idea of a fine than to that of the reparation of damage and, in any case, it would
be payable by the Treasury, which implies an additional burden for the taxpayer and also a reduction in
the resources that should go towards social programs." Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C.) No. 101, 1 101 (46) (Nov. 25, 2003); see
also WALZER, supra note 256, at 296-97 (noting that after the close of war, citizens are "political and
economic targets ... that is, they are the victims of military occupation, political reconstruction, and the
exaction of reparative payments. We may take the last of these as the clearest and simplest case of
collective punishment.").
267. See S.C. Res. 687,1 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687, at 7 (Apr. 8, 1991).
The Crime and Punishment ofStates
It would exceed the scope of this Article to offer a comprehensive theory
of permissible and impermissible collective punishment. Obviously, many
distinctions in law and morality are based on intent as the dividing line between
permissible or prohibited action, even when actions seem objectively identical
to the outside observer. If so, the fact that many permissible acts result in
unintentional collective harm may not be a convincing reason to relax the
prohibition on intentional collective punishment. And without such relaxation,
any paradigm of state crime and punishment would be hard to sustain.
The point worth emphasizing here, however, is that certain types of
legitimate actions, such as non-military sanctions, make the distinction between
collective punishment and inadvertent collective harm especially fuzzy in
practice. Moreover, if sanctions are imposed, at least in part, to generate
pressure on a rogue regime via its distressed population, the difference between
the instrumental use of the population for compellence, deterrence, or mere
revenge is increasingly hard to discern, either on practical or conceptual
grounds. If by naming such measures "sanctions" rather than "collective
punishment" the current international system tolerates harm to collectives, the
revulsion to state punishment on the ground of collective harm, even where it
takes the same exact form, may have a weaker moral ground to rest on.
C. Sovereign Equality
The principle of sovereign equality has been a foundation of international
law for many centuries. It first received formal recognition in the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia, and was subsequently reiterated in numerous instruments,
including the U.N. Charter. 26 8 Formally, the principle dictates that all states
enjoy equal status as a matter of law, regardless of relative population, territory,
resources, etc. A direct implication of the principle is that no state has the right
to intervene in another state, nor impose its will or interests on another.
Sovereign equality has often been invoked by international lawyers as a
reason to deny the concept of state punishment, which inherently assumes a
269hierarchical order between the punisher and the punished. If all states enjoy
equal sovereignty, how could one sit in judgment over, let alone punish,
another? 270 Naturally, all coercive action, whether punitive or preventive,
interferes with the subject's independence and free will in a way that challenges
its "sovereignty." And yet, the concept of punishment evokes psycho-
theological sentiments of a higher moral authority, and as such, it can have no
place among states in a modem secular world, where there is no recognized
superior entity. As one commentator put it, "the very idea of punishing States is
(indeed) completely alien to the contemporary international legal order based
268. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
269. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 156 (4th ed. 1925) ("The nature of the Law of
Nations as a law between, not above, sovereign states, excludes the possibility of punishing a state for an
international delinquency and of considering the latter in the light of a crime.").
270. See Luban, supra note 9, at 314-16. For a discussion about the fetishism of states, see
FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 59 (2d
ed. 1997).
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on the sovereignty of States. The term 'international crimes' is only and simply
used for labeling a certain kind of internationally wrongful acts [sic] of an
extremely grave nature."271 In an anarchic system that is constantly on the
verge or beyond the verge of violence, punishment that denotes superiority,
especially moral superiority, is an especially perilous paradigm. In comparison,
the evolution and expansion of international criminal law raised no such
concerns, as there was never a question about the hierarchy between a state or
international body and an individual.
Sovereign equality, however, is not an entirely convincing reason to
avoid the punishment of states. It is true that the justification for war as
punishment did not accidentally subside in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, just as the nation state succeeded the princely state and sovereign
equality gained a central and more universal power. 27 2 Also true is that it was
then that sovereign equality became synonymous with a lack of any normative
evaluation of international relations, including war, as best demonstrated by
Clausewitz. And yet, neither the concept of sovereignty nor that of sovereign
equality currently mean what they had meant in the nineteenth century, and it is
exactly the development in the international community's willingness to
engage in a normative evaluation of states' behavior that has driven their new
meaning.
In fact, any argument about sovereign equality as a safeguard from
punishment runs up against one of the presumably greatest achievements of
international law in the twentieth century, namely the principle's waning
effectiveness as a shield from external intervention. Numerous human rights,
environmental, labor, immigration, and other conventions have made the
domestic actions of any state the business of the international community. True,
the U.N. Charter still forbids countries from intervening in each other's internal
affairs, and the Declaration on Friendly Relations similarly views such
intervention suspiciously. 27 3 However, the international legal establishment has
sought to distinguish prohibited meddling from a welcomed upholding of
internationally-accepted values against recalcitrant members. The modern ideal
of international law, in other words, has reread sovereignty as responsibility,
not immunity. When states fail egregiously to discharge their responsibilities,
punishment-precisely with its normative evocation-should be restored from
its hiding place under the veil of prevention. As for the practical aspects of
sovereign equality, here, too, the principle of sovereign equality has been
compromised by the very structure of contemporary international institutions.
The U.N. Charter gave the five World War II allies special powers as
permanent members of the Security Council over all others, especially in the
271. Manfred Mohr, The ILC's Distinction Between 'International Crimes' and 'International
Delicts' and its Implications, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 115, 139
(Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987); see also Wyler, supra note 170, at 1160 (asserting that
crimes are divided into serious and non-serious breaches).
272. GERRY J. SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAw STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 30-37 (2004).
273. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7.
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sphere of peace and security. The same five powers are members of the
exclusive club of lawful possessors of nuclear weapons under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.274 In other fora, such as the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund, the votes of certain countries carry more weight
than others, allowing them greater influence over the institutions'
decisionmaking in exchange for their greater contribution to these selfsame
institutions.275 Sovereign immunity of foreign states in domestic courts has
been eroding in juridical scope and application, allowing courts to pass
judgments on the actions of foreign states. 76 In this state of affairs, sovereign
equality is more of a rhetorical tool that is conveniently employed or dismissed,
as the interest may be.
Naturally, a pragmatic concern derives from such practical compromises
over sovereign equality, and even more broadly, from the exact realization that
sovereign equality is a legal fiction that merely brushes over fundamental
differences among states. The ability of states to employ sanctions against other
states is not equal and uniform; the more powerful states are in a position to
inflict harm on others while remaining fairly immune to harm from others. If a
rule of law demands equality before the law, power disparities in the system
threaten a selective and self-serving infliction of punishment, which would then
be devastating to any notion of a rule of law.
At the same time, however, the exact same power disparities play out
where sanctions are employed as means of prevention, rather than punishment;
the more powerful states can "prevent," police, or compel others, while
remaining themselves immune to such efforts by others targeting them. Unless
we believe that a concept (or fiction) of equality before the law is more
meaningful when it comes to punishment than when it concerns policing or
prevention efforts, the concerns about sovereign equality and inequality are not
very different whether our paradigm is one of guilt or one of threat. As Carl
Schmitt has pointed out, "[t]he world will not become depoliticalized with the
aid of definitions and constructions ..... 277
D. Institutional Considerations and the Rule ofInternational Law
Can we imagine an international institution entrusted with trying states
for criminal behavior? Is the lack of such an institution a political inevitability
in an anarchic system or a conscious choice to prefer peace over justice,
274. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
275. Horacio Javier Etchichury, Book Note, 7 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 188, 189 (2004)
(reviewing MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2003)).
276. See, e.g., Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity, or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 853, 861 (2011) (citing examples of domestic judgments that eschewed absolute sovereign
immunity in such cases).
277. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 78 (George Schwab trans., 1996).
Schmitt then criticizes the rhetorical and legalized masking of political self-interest in either preventive
or punitive terms: "War is condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications,
protection of treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace remain." Id. at 79.
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flexibility over judgment? Institutional considerations may be more of a
derivative of the previous three than an independent explanation of the aversion
to state punishment. Nonetheless, they deserve separate attention, as they affect
both the conceptual and pragmatic implications of any critique of the
abandonment of state punishment in modem intemational law.
The international system does not have and never has had a mechanism
dedicated to criminal investigation, adjudication, or punishment of states. 27 8
The punitive model of the Catholic Just War theory was content to leave
judgment of the justness of the war in the hands of the affected sovereign, with
divine intervention (or, perhaps, chance 279) ultimately vindicating or
condemning the sovereign's judgment.
The secularization of international law meant that divine intervention
could not be counted on in the design of a legal regime for the use of force.
Historical experience has also shown that the judgment of sovereigns was, at
best, precarious and self-serving. To have legitimate punishment meant,
instead, that some institutional and procedural features had to be installed to
distinguish legitimate punishment from mere vigilantism or international
lynching. Without such structures in place, and given the foundational principle
of sovereign equality, the concept of punishment threatened to be a disguise for
self-interested brute force, applied by the strong against the weak, leaving the
former immune from its reach.
Throughout the twentieth century there were several proposals to
establish an international criminal court for states. In 1925, for instance, the
Inter-Parliamentary Union on the Criminality of Wars of Aggression and the
Organization of International Repressive Measures adopted a report by
Vespasien V. Pella on the possibility of collective criminality of states. 28 0 The
report identified certain offenses, such as aggression or other offenses against
the sovereignty or territorial integrity of other nations, which were by their
nature offenses committed by states.281 During World War II, Hans Kelsen
sketched out his idea for an intemational judicial body to adjudicate state
crimes and impose punishment, if necessary, through military means.282 Sir
Hartley Shawcross, the lead British prosecutor at Nuremberg, observed:
[T]here is not anything startlingly new in the adoption of the principle that the
State as such is responsible for its criminal acts . . . the immeasurable
potentialities for evil inherent in the State in this age . .. would seem to
278. See GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW I: INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 673 (3d ed. 1957) (claiming that international
tribunals have denied any jurisdiction to exercise quasi-penal powers).
279. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE VERDICT OF BATTLE: THE LAW OF VICTORY AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN WAR 50-55, 77-79 (2012) (claiming that wars in the eighteenth century were
sometimes viewed as wagers, the outcome of which was accepted by the warring parties as
determinative of rights and entitlements).
280. See U.N. Secretary General, Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal
Jurisdiction, 71 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.l (1949).
281. Id. at 72.
282. See HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 19-23, 127-40 (1944). For Kelsen, a world court
with compulsory universal jurisdiction was a centerpiece of any international order.
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demand, quite imperatively, means of repression of criminal conduct even more
drastic and more effective than in the case of individuals.
2 8 3
All of those proposals were dismissed fairly quickly, 284 and the
Nuremberg trials, although not without debate, ultimately addressed crimes
committed by individuals only. Suggestions by some of the delegates to the
negotiating conference on the 1948 Genocide Convention that genocide be
treated as a crime committed by states and subject to the punishment of states
by an international criminal court were similarly rejected. 285 The 1998 ICC
Rome Statute limited its jurisdiction to natural persons, implicitly excluding
states and corporations.286 The few available courts that do have competence to
pass judgment on the conduct of states, such as the International Court of
287Justice, various regional courts of justice, or the World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement Body, have no authority to pronounce guilt or order
punishment. At most, they pronounce "responsibility for breaches" and order
reparations. In an international order that is more preoccupied with peace than
with justice, as far as states are concerned, this is not surprising. It is this same
rationale that housed the ICJ in The Peace-Palace at The Hague. And, it is the
same rationale that eliminated the concept of "international crimes" from the
Draft Articles.
The avoidance of any punitive measures and the focus on compensatory
reparations alone might well create incentives for efficient breach and
encourage further violations of international law. The absence of any punitive
measures in the sanctions available to international courts and tribunals also
stands in clear tension with any ideal of an international rule of law, including
one that is meant to serve as a check on violence. As Dinah Shelton critically
observed with regard to the Draft Articles,
The near absence of deterrence and punishment in considering reparations ...
seems inconsistent with the expressed concern for restoring and upholding the
rule of law in the interest of the international community. Remedies serve
social as well as individual needs. Concern for the larger consequences of an
internationally wrongful act may suggest a response that will deter the
responsible state from repeating the breach and deter others from emulating the
conduct. In this respect, the articles, by limiting themselves to remedial
measures, seem to have missed an opportunity to strengthen measures to
promote compliance. 288
Beyond the conceptual and symbolic harm to the rule of law, as a
practical matter, the institutional overview of international courts and tribunals
misses the judicial functions already exercised by the UNSC, alongside its
283. THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: OPENING SPEECHES OF THE CHIEF
PROSECUTORS 57-58 (1946).
284. Quincy Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 67
(1952).
285. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 97th Mtg. at 364, U.N. Doc. F/794, A/633 (Nov. 9, 1948).
286. ICC Statute, art. 25(1), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
287. For discussion about a possible reform of the ICJ to allow it to punish states, see Lang,
supra note 9, at 249-50.
288. Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 833, 845 (2002).
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semi-executive and semi-legislative roles. Of course, from a perspective of a
democratic constitutional order, having a judiciary which is indistinct from the
other branches of government is a contradiction in terms. More importantly,
under the terms of the Charter, the UNSC was intended more as a policing than
an adjudicatory body. Recognizing the UNSC as a judicial body might thus
seem to stand in dissonance with the UNSC's primary interest in peace, not
justice. Recall Shachter's description of the UNSC's efforts to avoid any
language of blame or punishment so as to have maximum flexibility in ordering
measures to restore peace and security. 289 Kelsen, too, concluded that "the
purpose of enforcement action under Article 39 is not: to maintain or restore
the law, but to maintain or restore peace, which is not necessarily identical with
the law." 290
Schachter was correct in arguing that the Charter system intended to
secure broad powers to the UNSC, and especially the permanent members,
unrestrained by considerations of guilt or judgment in the legalistic sense of the
word. Certainly, the United States' position has long been that issues relating to
the use of force should remain within the exclusive consideration of the UNSC
and not be addressed by the ICJ or any other organ, as according to the
American claim, such issues were inherently "political" rather than "legal." 29 1
Nevertheless, the description of U.N. practice as avoiding "charges and
counter-charges of illegality," even if accurate in 1965, does not aptly reflect
the more recent practice of the UNSC. Authorizations to use force under
Chapter VII, decisions on sanctions under Chapter VII, and general resolutions
addressing particular incidents or situations often read like courtroom
judgments: evaluating behavior, finding violations, assigning responsibility,
and prescribing action-all but using the terminology of blame and punishment
(the Resolutions authorizing the use of force against Iraq in 1990 make a
289. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
290. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 294 (1950).
291. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J., 14, 26 (June 27); see also Abraham D. Sofaer, The United States and the World Court, 80 PROC.
OF THE ANN. MEETING (AMER. SOC'Y INT'L L.) 204, 209 (1986) (stating, as legal counsel to the U.S.
Dept. of State at the time of the Nicaragua Decision: "We believe that, when a nation asserts a right to
use force illegally and acts on that assertion, other affected nations have the right to counter such illegal
activities. The United States cannot rely on the ICJ to decide such questions properly and fairly. Indeed,
no state can do so"), quoted in Andrew Srulevitch, Non-Compliance with the ICI: A Review, CONF. OF
PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AM. JEWISH ORGS. (July 8, 2004), http://www.conferenceofpresidents.org/ICJ
%2 0Noncompliance%2OExecutive%2OSummary/o2OUpload.doc. Even with regard to the ICC, although
accepting, in principle, the notion of indicting individuals for the crime of aggression, the American
position has been that such indictments should only arise with the consent of the U.N. Security Council
See Harold Koh & Stephan Rapp, Special State Department Briefing, U.S. Engagement with the
International Criminal Court: Outcome of Recently Concluded Review Conference (June 15, 2010)
(remarks of Harold Koh) ("And while we think the final resolution took insufficient account of the
Security Council's assigned role to define aggression, the states parties rejected solutions that provided
for jurisdiction without a Security Council or consent-based screen. We hope the crime will be improved
in the future and will continue to engage toward that end."); see also, Samson Ntale, Former Nuremberg
Prosecutor Chides U.S., China, Russia, CNN, June 9, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-09/world
/uganda.intemational.criminal.court_nazi-war-crimes-aggression (stating that the United States
"wanted the crime of aggression defined and wanted to be sure that the U.N. Security Council will run
the show when the ICC was implementing it").
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292
particularly poignant example). Thomas Franck has also offered a view of
the UNSC as a judicial organ, suggesting that in their deliberations, the
members of the UNSC act as a de-facto jury, assessing the factual and legal
claims of states arguing about measures under Chapter VII.293 James Crawford,
too, remarked that "[a] determination under article 39 of the Charter that there
has been an act of aggression entails what amounts to a binding judgment by an
international executive organ."294
If so, the UNSC is in practice not only policing, but also adjudicating
charges and counter-charges of illegality, even if for the alleged purposes of
prevention rather than punishment. Moreover, the preventive guise allows the
UNSC to pass judgment and order action without the full institutional and
procedural guarantees that would be required in an explicitly acknowledged
punitive mode. And as noted earlier, while concerns about power disparity
making a scarecrow of the concept of punishment are stronger when the legal
concept of punishment is taken seriously, such concerns must persist when
prevention or policing efforts are also confined to the weaker members of the
international community.
An altogether different critique of institutional considerations barring
state punishment is that even for a successful prevention regime, an appropriate
institutional framework must be in place to ensure that prevention is carried out
only where necessary, only to the extent necessary, and in an effective manner.
Many of the critiques of the existing U.N. system, as well as of other
international legal regimes, are over the impotence of existing regimes in
preventing the harms they were ostensibly meant to fight.295 As Michael
Glennon observed with regard to the use of force,
Between 1945 and 1999, two-thirds of the members of the United Nations-
126 states out of 189-fought 291 interstate conflicts in which over 22 million
people were killed. This series of conflicts was capped by the Kosovo
campaign in which nineteen NATO democracies representing 780 million
people flagrantly violated the Charter.2 96
Of course, it is impossible to know how much use of force the world
would have suffered from had the U.N. Charter not been in place, and
consequently how effective it has been in curbing interstate violence. And still,
any attempt to invoke the existing international institutional architecture as a
292. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 678, supra note 90; see also S.C. Res 1298, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298
(May 17, 2000) (imposing sanctions on Ethiopia and Eritrea).
293. THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO WAR: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATTACKS 21, 67 (2002).
294. Crawford, Sanctions and Countermeasures, supra note 215, at 58.
295. Robert J. Delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and the Failure of the United Nations
Collective Security System, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 871, 926-40 (2007); Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of
Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 539, 540 (2001-2002); see also ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, POSTMODERN ETHICS 64 (1993)
(asserting that human rights have "become a war-cry and blackmail weapon in the hands of aspiring
'community leaders' wishing to pick up powers that the state has dropped"), quoted in Upendra Baxi,
Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 138
(1998).
296. Glennon, supra note 295, at 540.
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reason for avoiding state punishment must be able to withstand the critique
over this same architecture's (in)ability to engage in effective prevention.
In sum, as the foregoing sections have demonstrated, an underlying focus
on peace and stability in international relations has been a strong driving force
behind the elimination of state punishment in international law and emphasis
on prevention. In imagining possible reasons for this belief, one might imagine
that state punishment threatens to fuel revenge and violence, that it runs counter
to the liberal commitment to freedom from collective punishment, and that it is
difficult to reconcile with a system of sovereign equality that has no dedicated
judicial organs to pass judgment or sentence. All of these concerns, however,
are present to some degree or another when the international system engages in
coercion under a paradigm of prevention. At the same time, the paradigm of
prevention itself harbors its own perils, threatening distorted outcomes for
peace and security. To these, I turn next.
IV. THE UNDERAPPRECIATED COSTS OF THE SHIFT FROM PUNISHMENT TO
PREVENTION
In what follows, I turn to examine the broader normative implications of
avoiding state punishment in the name of a preference for peace over justice. In
particular, I examine the possible unintended or unacknowledged consequences
that the shift from punishment to prevention may have had for international
relations in the realm of peace and security themselves. I also consider what is
lost by a reliance on a preventive paradigm, namely, the moral evaluation of
state conduct. To reiterate, my ultimate claim is not a prescriptive call for the
reintroduction of state punishment into international law. Such a claim requires
much deeper exploration of what a system of punishment might look like,
which I do not undertake here. My ambition here is a narrower one: to
demonstrate that the elimination of any concept of state punishment may not
necessarily be more conducive to international peace and security.
To do so, I borrow from U.S. domestic criminal law, where a similar
tendency toward prevention has gained force from the 1950s onwards, with a
wave of federal and state statutes expanding the sanctions available for the
government in dealing with the threat of crime. Examples of this trend abound.
The power to detain drug-dependents was added to the civil commitment of the
mentally ill, a practice which existed since the late nineteenth century.297
"Megan's Law" statutes, mandating the public registration of sexual offenders
298when they are released from prison, are now on the law books of most states.
In 1992, Washington was the first state to pass a "Sexual Predator" law,299
mandating the continued incarceration of sex offenders after the conclusion of
their criminal sentence; several states followed both before and after the
297. Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless
Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 711-13 (1993).
298. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1431 (2001).
299. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09 (1992).
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Supreme Court upheld a similar Kansas law as constitutional. 300 "Three-
strikes" laws, introduced in 1993 (although with some far older historical
origins), stipulate life sentences for repeat offenders. 30 1 Throughout the 1990s,
"community policing" initiatives, coupled with new substantive offenses such
as "drug loitering" or "gang loitering," augmented police departments'
preventive role and authority.302 The federal government has enacted laws
authorizing civil forfeiture on the basis of "probable cause" alone, and the
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to allow searches and
seizures of persons, cars, and houses without any individualized suspicion at
all.3 0 3 By 1998, Carol Steiker observed that "[t]he preventive state is all the
rage these days, and it can be seen in many different guises."a
Despite the classification of such sanctions as preventive, none of them
(but for the incarceration of the mentally ill) is, in fact, solely preventive. All
have a measure of moral blame attached to them, one that is connected to past
practices as well as to possible future conduct. For this same reason, one cannot
simply classify these sanctions as civil or regulatory rather than criminal.305
The blurring of punishment and prevention in the use of domestic penal
sanctions has been met with criticism on several grounds, even while
acknowledging the legitimate benefits of preventive measures. While the Bill
of Rights as interpreted by the Supreme Court offers important due process
protections against excessive or undue punishment, far fewer protections exist
with regard to excessive or undue prevention.306 By cloaking punishment as
prevention, the state can avoid many of the limitations on its punishing powers,
including proportionality in sentencing, double jeopardy, and substantive and
procedural due process guarantees, leaving those subject to preventive
measures largely defenseless. 3 07
300. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
301. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1994) (applying the life-sentence to serious violent felony
convictions).
302. Steiker, Limits, supra note 14, at 774-75.
303. Id. at 775.
304. Id. at 774.
305. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
404 (1958) ("What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction ... is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition."). For a discussion about the distinction
between criminal and civil sanctions, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection:
Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator
Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSuES 69 (1996).
306. Schulhofer, supra note 305, at 78-85; Steiker Limits, supra note 14, at 771-74; Steiker,
Punishment, supra note 15; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 763-64 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a preventative detention system runs contrary to American jurisprudential
values, particularly the presumption of innocence).
307. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 763-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 96 (1958) (holding that constitutional limitations on ex post facto laws only apply to penal statutes,
which the Court defined as statutes that "impose[] a disability for the purposes of punishment"). Because
statutes can have both penal and non-penal effects, however, the Court in Trop ruled that a statute's
controlling purpose drives the determination. And so, even if a statute does impose a disability, it will be
considered non-penal if its controlling purpose is to accomplish some legitimate governmental purpose
other than punishment.
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A more scathing criticism voiced by criminal law experts is that
conflating punishment with prevention leads to perverse outcomes: over-
punishment of the not-guilty (such as in the "three-strikes" laws that are not
limited to violent felonies) or the under-punishment of the guilty (sentencing
guidelines that limit the punishment for some types of unsuccessful crimes).30 s
Judges, too, expressed concerns about the mismatch between the sanction and
its goal: In his dissent to Schall, Justice Marshall argued that the preventive
detention of juveniles worked against the statute's own preventive purposes, 309
driving juvenile detainees into a "downward spiral of criminal activity."
310
Of course, any analogy between the domestic and international realms is
imperfect. The very different nature of actors (natural humans vs. constructed
beings), the different modes of relevant "punishment" or "prevention"
mechanisms (e.g., incarceration vs. monetary reparations), and the lack of
centralized adjudication or enforcement mechanisms-all make the
transposition from the domestic onto the international an approximation, at
best.31' Moreover, to the extent that prevention is a growing trend in domestic
criminal law, it is one that complements-rather than replaces-a mainstream
structure of punishment.
Nonetheless, many risks associated with a threat-based paradigm that
have been identified in the domestic sphere do have resonance, mutatis
mutandis, in international law. In the present discussion, I focus on the possible
transposition of the concern about the mismatch between the gravity of the
sanction and the purpose for which it is imposed. Particularly, I examine the
possibility that the preventive paradigm may invite a greater degree of violence
even against those who are not guilty (or necessarily threatening), and may at
the same time also raise obstacles to violence even against those who are guilty
(and threatening). Both possibilities are difficult to prove empirically; they may
also be corrected against in various ways. But to the extent that a preference for
prevention relies on an association between prevention and peace, the
possibility that this association is wrong, or at least overestimated, must be
considered.
To demonstrate this possibility, I discuss two issues of contemporary
international concern, both drawn from the jus ad bellum field: the first is
anticipatory self-defense and the second is humanitarian intervention.
308. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) (1962). The cases are limited to those "in which the actor's
conduct is so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of the crime that neither the
conduct nor the actor presents a public danger sufficient to justify the normal application of Subsection
(1)." Id. § 5.05(2) note. The emphasis, thus, is on dangerousness of the actor, rather than on his guilt.
309. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 291-97 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 292.
311. Cf Noam Zohar, Collective War and Individualistic Ethics: Against the Conscription of
"Self-Defense, " 21 POL. THEORY 606 (1993) (criticizing the analogy to criminal law doctrines of self-
defense when justifying the principle of distinction in war). See generally Paul H. Robinson & Adil
Ahmad Haque, Advantaging Aggressors: Justice & Deterrence in International Law, 3 HARv. NAT'L
SEC. J. 143 (2011) (discussing the possibilities and limits of transpositions from domestic law to
international law and drawing on the domestic law of self-defense to analyze the international doctrine).
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A. Anticipatory Self-Defense and Preventive Wars
The exact scope of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter has long been debated
in the context of the right of states to respond with military force to the threat of
armed attack from another state, but before having actually suffered one. 3 12
While the wording of Article 51 suggests that an actual armed attack must
occur before a state can respond in self-defense, a broad consensus holds that
where a threat is sufficiently grave and imminent, customary international law
does allow a state to use proportionate and necessary force to fend off an
imminent danger. 1 This understanding harks back to the doctrine first
formulated by Daniel Webster who was Secretary of State during the Caroline
incident of 1837. In his famous letter to the British governor of Canada,
Webster posited that anticipatory self-defense was legitimate where a threat left
"no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." 3 14
No consensus, however, surrounds a more expanded understanding of
preemptive wars in response to a non-imminent threat. Such preemptive force
is especially controversial where the threat emanates from non-state actors. In
the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11th, President George W.
Bush and his administration advocated a doctrine of preventive wars, in
particular where the threat involved rogue regimes and their pursuit of nuclear
proliferation.3 15 Taking the idea of preemptive strikes farther away from
Webster's formulation, the doctrine was nonetheless supported by a number of
contemporary scholars, some even calling for international recognition of "a
duty to prevent."3 16
Despite the habitual association of this expansive reading of the right to
engage in anticipatory self-defense with President Bush, who became, on
312. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 165-69 (2005);
MICHAEL DOYLE, STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
(2008).
313. U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility 54, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) ("[A] threatened State, according to long
established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no
other means would deflect it, and the action is proportionate"). See also DOYLE, supra note 312, at 3.
314. See The Caroline (exchange of diplomatic notes between Great Britain and the United
States, 1842), 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 412 (1906). For the view that the
Webster formulation survived the Charter, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE
ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATrACKS 107 (2002); cf CHRISTINE D. GRAY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 112 (2004) (claiming that even anticipatory self-defense
is of "doubtful status").
315. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 15 (2002) ("We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today's adversaries.... The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.").
316. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & Lee Feinstein, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN AFF.
136-50 (2004) (arguing in favor of states' duty to prevent security and humanitarian disasters, even if at
the expense of others' sovereign integrity); Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States that
'Might' Have Weapons ofMass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1, 3 (2009) (arguing that preemptive
force "is justified when a reasonable state would conclude a WMD threat is sufficiently likely and
severe that forceful measures are necessary").
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account of it, the focus of harsh criticism from around the globe, American
presidents before Bush, as well as leaders of other countries have long
advocated similar views. 3 At the NATO summit in Prague in November
2002, NATO adopted Military Committee (MC) 472, "NATO's Military
Concept for Defense Against Terrorism," a document that implicitly supported
the option of preemptive strikes against terrorist threats. 3 18 Even the European
Council's Security Strategy report asserted that, "we should be ready to act
before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too
early." 3 19 And in a section of the document titled, "Policy Implications for
Europe," it added:
[We need to be m]ore active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to
the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention,
including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development
activities .. . . We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid,
and when necessary, robust intervention.320
The U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, on the
other hand, claimed that "if there are good arguments for preventive military
action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security
Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to." The rationale,
explained the Panel, is that "in a world full of perceived potential threats, the
risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention ... is simply too great
for the legality of unilateral preventive action ..... "321
Surely, any debate over the legitimate scope of preemptive or preventive
force under international law is not limited to a preventive paradigm, but could
easily arise under a punitive paradigm as well. In domestic criminal law,
different choices are made across systems and jurisdictions with regard to the
punishment of inchoate crimes, conspiracy, or threats-all of which do not
necessarily progress to more egregious offenses.322 Debates also abound over
the question of preemptive self-defense and the right of a would-be victim to
act against a would-be assailant prior to any actual physical violence.323
317. Delahunty, supra note 295, at 876; see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE
THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS (2006).
318. The document stated that "NATO's actions should ... work on the assumption that it is
preferable to deter terrorist attacks or to prevent their occurrence rather than deal with their
consequences." International Military Staff, NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Jan. 4, 2011, http://www.nato.int /ims/doculterrorism.htm.
319. Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, EUROPEAN
UNION INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES 7 (Dec. 12, 2003), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/solanae.pdf.
320. Id. at 17.
321. U.N. High-Level Panel, supra note 313.
322. See Herbert Wechsler, William Kenneth Jones & Harold L. Kom, The Treatment of
Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and
Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 1022 (1961) ("Prevailing law reflects no general or coherent
theory in determining the sanctions that are authorized upon conviction of attempt, solicitation, or
conspiracy.").
323. See, e.g., Martin E. Veinsreideris, Comment, The Prospective Effects of Modifying
Existing Law to Accommodate Preemptive Self-defense by Battered Women, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 613
(2000) (discussing the debate surrounding preemptive self-defense in the context of Battered Woman's
Syndrome).
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Moreover, even the punitive framework of classical Just War theory
recognized some room for preemptive use of force. Gentili held that as the
preservation of the state should be a primary concern, sovereigns were entitled
324to use force to deter threats even before they had fully materialized. Grotius
forwarded a yet more expanded view of preventive action, holding that war
might be justified not only as punishment for past wrong but also preemptively,
"to prevent some future Mischief."325
Undoubtedly, rare would be the case where a threat is not accompanied
by a past transgression, further justifying the need to "prevent some future
mischief." The lines between punishment and prevention are further blurred
when one considers that under the U.N. Charter, the threat of use of force is
itself a violation of international law,326 even if it does not justify the use of
force under Article 51.
And still, overall, a punitive framework is generally more restrictive in
what it allows by way of sanctions in anticipation of crimes. Thus, criminal law
does not allow punishment for acts of preparation alone; and the punishment of
inchoate crimes (conspiracy, attempt, or solicitation) requires proof of mens rea
as well as of some overt action or substantial step in the direction of completing
the crime. In a similar vein, Grotius warned that "war is not to be waged for an
offence merely inchoate, unless the matter affected be of great concern, and
some injurious consequences or some great peril have already ensued."327
Conversely, prevention can justify a defensive action against any threat, even
one that does not constitute a "crime," opening up for retaliation against state
actions that would not constitute, under Grotius's formulation, "injurious
consequences" or "great peril." Preemptive strikes and preventive wars-and
debates about them-could thus conceivably exceed the literal scope of Article
51 or the customary principles of anticipatory self-defense, and beyond what
would otherwise be plausible under a punitive model.
To make this possibility more concrete, consider the case of a preemptive
strike against a rogue regime that we fear might become violent and/or has
demonstrated itself to be violent in the past. A punitive model would allow for
a preemptive strike only if the rogue regime violates international obligations,
such as developing WMDs in violation of treaty or customary obligations. The
development of such weapons could be considered a crime for which
punishment may be inflicted, regardless of whether these weapons are
thereafter used. The development of most other types of weapons, however, is
not banned under international law, nor is amassing troops along the border.
Recall that under the League of Nations, there was some effort to prohibit not
only the threat of use of force, but also preparatory acts such as arms
procurement.328 But this effort never materialized, either under the League or
324. Blane & Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 251.
325. Id. at 252.
326. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
327. THOMAS ALFRED WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 256 (1899).
328. COLLECTIVE SECURITY, supra note 57, at 330-31 (remarks of Professor Rend Cassin)
("The question is what the Council ... can do regarding a State which, without committing an
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under its successor organization. As such, a punitive model would not allow for
a preemptive strike before an actual "armed attack" has occurred (unless we
were to choose an expansive paradigm of threat as guilt), or before the threat
becomes very imminent; a preventive model, on the other hand, might allow a
risk-averse state to preempt more remote prospects of a future attack.
Prevention, moreover, is more susceptible to over-use simply because it is
harder to assess what is necessary for "prevention" than what is necessary for
"punishment." In domestic law, sentencing guidelines restrict judges' discretion
in punishing the guilty, but fewer guidelines constrain preventive measures.
The principles of necessity and proportionality guide the use of force on the
international plane, but it is presumably easier to apply them with regard to an
act of aggression that has already occurred than against an uncertain act of
aggression that may or may not occur and that would be of one or another
magnitude. The war in Afghanistan which began in response to the attacks of
September 11th continues to this day with the justification of preempting
further attacks, with much controversy over whether the continued use of force
is in fact necessary or effective for such preemption.329
Given these considerations, the preventive model of international law
might encourage or at least sustain greater levels of initial violence than a
punitive model would, and to borrow from the domestic criminal law analogy,
result in the over-punishment of those both not guilty and not immediately
threatening. In addition, if threats warrant a defensive violent action, perception
and misperceptions of threats invite a spiraling reactionary vision of threats,
thereby risking more violence and hostility.
Because a preventive model forces us to contemplate sanctions before an
injury occurs, moreover, it lends itself to backdoor determination of certain acts
as "threats to peace and security," even where there is no international
consensus that the acts in question are a violation of international law. An
unresolved debate over whether there are any limits to the UNSC's legislative
or sanctioning powers offers supporting evidence for this point. 3 30 If the
UNSC's powers are boundless, it would be legitimate for the UNSC to deem
climate change or the financial crisis "global threats to peace and security,"
which warrant a defensive action as stipulated by the UNSC. Absent multiparty
treaties that impose clear obligations in the spheres of environmental protection
or financial regulation, no country could be found in breach of the law; but it
could be found posing a threat to the international community. While any
assertion of preventive powers in these areas would be limited to collective
decisionmaking by the UNSC (as opposed to any single state), it nonetheless
aggression, should perform repeated acts in violation of international engagements, notably of a
collective engagement concerning armaments. It will be necessary to provide special sanctions for this
offence. . . .").
329. See Eric Schmitt & Scott Shane, Crux ofAfghan Debate: Will More Troops Curb Terror?,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/world/asia/08terror.htmI.
330. For discussion of the limits of the U.N. Security Council's legislative powers, see Stefan
Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 175 (2005).
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suggests that prevention may sometimes be subject to fewer limitations than
punishment.
B. Humanitarian Interventions
For some classical just war theorists, the injury that justified punishment
included not only injuries suffered by a wronged sovereign or his subjects, but
also injuries inflicted by a sovereign against his own subjects. Gentili wrote
that "the subjects of others do not seem to me to be outside of that kinship of
nature and the society formed by the whole world;" 331 and both he and Grotius
cited with agreement Seneca's claim from the first century that "[i]f a man does
not attack my country, but yet is a heavy burden to his own, and although
separated from my people he afflicts his own, such debasement of mind
nevertheless cuts him off from us."3 32
The legal right to punish offenses committed toward others was once a
functional and moral imperative. It was necessary to preserve order in a society
lacking any higher authority other than God. Gentili thus introduced the
concept of accountability by the sovereign, which was essential "unless we
wish to make sovereigns exempt from the law and bound by no statutes and no
precedents." 333 It was also a moral, natural right of sovereigns to punish an
offender for "sins against human nature." 334 Grotius also believed that in
practice, this form of punishment would likely be more moderate, as the
punisher acts as a disinterested arbiter of a legal dispute rather than as an
immediately affected and partial party.335
Any assertion of a right to intervene on behalf of oppressed citizens faced
increasing challenges as the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention
gained increasing traction during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With
the rise of positivism and the decline of natural law, and the replacement of
ruling dynasties with national leaders, the normative status of humanitarian
interventions grew more contested, sparking debates among scholars and
policymakers over its juridical basis and practical manifestation. 336
Similar debates continued into the early twentieth century, with critics
opposing the newly-introduced term, "humanitarian interventions," either on
the jurisprudential ground that no right for such interventions existed or on the
pragmatic grounds of its questionable utility. Notwithstanding many gradations,
to support a right of humanitarian intervention most writers demanded a nexus
331. Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Swrez, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 110, 115 (1991) (quoting Gentili).
332. Id. at 112 (quoting Grotius' wording; both Grotius and Gentili attributed this sentiment to
Seneca, though with different phrasings).
333. Id. at 115.
334. Blane & Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 252.
335. Id. at 255.
336. For a discussion of the emergence of the terminology of "humanitarian intervention" and
similar concepts in the nineteenth century, see SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-26 (2001), which argues that military
interventions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although sometimes portrayed as early
forms of humanitarian interventions, were nothing of the like.
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between the rights violated and an internal conflict that constituted a general
danger to others outside the boundaries of the state.
Debates over the legitimacy and desirability of humanitarian interventions
as well as the emphasis on prevention persisted into the U.N. Charter era,
following much the same path as their predecessors. Opponents of
humanitarian interventions continued to question their practical sensibility,337
while proponents continued to emphasize the pragmatic risk to outsiders from
the continued abuse of domestic rights, through, for instance, the flow of
338
refugees and/or destabilization of adjacent countries. Moral arguments for or
against intervention, inedpendent of instrumental evaluations, have been
marginalized.
This couching of debates about humanitarian interventions in
instrumental terms is paradigmatic of the decline of the punitive framework and
the rise of the preventive one. Instrumental arguments may be made sincerely,
with the belief that such benefits or risks would actually materialize; or they
can be made tactically, i.e., with the belief that a discussion of risks and
benefits would prove more pallatable to domestic and international audiences
than arguments about just desert or other moral claims. What is evident, in any
case, is that when suggesting to engage in humanitarian interventions,
policymakers feel the need to justify such actions in pragmatic, rather than
normative terms. This, again, resonates of Kahan, who argues that
consequentialist debates about coercison are often more attractive because they
avoid deeper moral controversies over whether punishment is deserved.33
Take, for example, NATO's justification for Operation Allied Hope in
Kosovo. An excerpt from an April 23, 1999 press statement claims the
following:
1. The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for
which NATO has stood since its foundation . . . . It is the culmination of a
deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by the
Belgrade regime ....
2. NATO's military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
supports the political aims of the international community . . .: a peaceful,
multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security
and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis ....
8. The long-planned, unrestrained and continuing assault by Yugoslav. . .forces
on Kosovars ... are aggravating the already massive humanitarian catastrophe.
This threatens to destabilise the surrounding region ....
337. See, e.g., Robert L. Phillips, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: JUST WAR VS. PACIFISM 1, 3 (Robert L. Phillips & Duane L. Cady eds., 1996) ("There
is often a very large gap between the (sometimes) good intentions of the interveners and the carrying out
of an operation."); Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 117, 121 (1991) ("The nub of the matter ... is that if one deems the original intention of the
founding members to be controlling with respect to the legitimate occasions for the use of force,
humanitarian intervention is illegal.").
338. Yonatan Lupu, Rules, Gaps and Power: Assessing Reform of the U.N. Charter, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 881, 906 (2006); see also CHESTERMAN, supra note 336, at 132-33.
339. See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
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17. It is our aim to make stability in Southeast Europe a priority of our
transatlantic agenda ... .340
A purely punitive paradigm would have found the claims made in
paragraph (1) sufficient to warrant intervention. Grotius, one might imagine,
would have supported intervention to punish Milogevid and protect the human
rights of the oppressed Kosovars. Some contemporary writers have, in fact,
argued that the strategic bombings in Serbia should be considered a legitimate
punishment of the state. 341 But the drafters of the statement believed that given
the international legal climate, any portrayal of the bombings as a punitive
measure against Serbia would not do. Instead, the goals of security, regional
stability, and prevention of refugee flows had to be invoked in order for the
military campaign to be considered just and legitimate under existing legal and
social paradigms.
A similar trend is apparent from reviewing Security Council Resolution
1973, authorizing NATO's use of force in Libya: The Preamble finds that the
attacks by the regime on the population "may amount to crimes against
humanity," but also that the "plight of refugees and foreign workers" is a cause
of concern and that the "situation in [Libya] continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security." 342
It is hard to assess what pragmatic implications, if any, this observation
has. It may be that as long as all relevant actors understand the need to
articulate their claims in functional-preventive terms, whether sincere or not,
there are no practical consequences to the avoidance of a punitive rhetoric
whatsoever. It is nonetheless possible, however, that the current preventive
paradigm tolerates fewer interventions than would a punitive one, for instance,
in cases where there is no mass flow of refugees, no danger of destabilizing
adjacent countries, and no overt civil war, and yet the population suffers dearly
(examples would include North Korea or Burma). If so, the preventive
paradigm of international law, borrowing once again from domestic criminal
law, may result in the under-punishment of the guilty.
Moreover, Ryan Goodman has argued that justifications do matter when
it comes to humanitarian interventions. 343 Goodman claims that by framing the
cause of war as humanitarian, rather than as self-interested, the humanitarian
justification operates to facilitate hostilities and encourages alternative paths to
war. 344 While Goodman's focus is on humanitarian versus non-humanitarian
justifications, his argumentation suggests that punitive and preventive
340. Statement on Kosovo, supra note 244.
341. Lang supra note 11, at 253. Note that Lang views the bombings as both deterrent and
retributive.
342. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 1, paras. 7, 15, 21.
343. See Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
107 (2006).
344. See id. at 126-27.
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justifications may also have a different impact on the willingness and scope of
using force. 34 5
Beyond the pragmatics, however, there is an underlying moral tone of the
turn from punishment to prevention, especially in the context of humanitarian
interventions. Articulating mass human rights abuses as a "threat" rather than
as a "crime" comes at a cost to the international community's own self-identity.
The avoidance of a moral confrontation about what constitutes a "crime," of
what constitutes just desert, and of how just punishment can and should be
inflicted, all sacrifice the ability of the international community to place moral
blame.
,This point relates to the broader theme of the expressive power of the law,
and of criminal law and criminal punishment in particular. 3 46 Others have
pointed out that the criminal trial and punishment is intended to serve an
expressive, symbolic role in drawing the line between permissible and
impermissible behavior and in asserting a moral stance of the community
charging the criminal. Labeling an act "a crime" serves a shaming function that
the label of "violation" is devoid of. With the suppression of the concept of
state crime and punishment in international law, "we the people of the
international community" may have lost a unified moral claim against any
transgressor, leaving only a self-interested, defensive posture. Contemporary
theologian Oliver O'Donovan has aptly captured this consequence of the
preventive paradigm in his work:
But the attempt to privilege the defensive aim exclusively is a significant retreat
from the spirit of the juridical proposal. It withdraws from the concept of an
international community of right to the antagonistic concept of mortal combat;
correspondingly, it is formally egoistic, protecting the rights of self-interest
while excluding those of altruistic engagement . .. Its effects, in other words,
are wholly demoralising. 34 7
Moralizing language, of course, has its perils, especially when one
considers moral relativism and the bleak historical record of using violence in
the name of moral (or ideological, or religious) claims. But if the international
community has any claim to being a community, it must rest on some
normative principles, even if those meet some resistance or contestation from
within. De-moralization or a-moralization runs its own risks.
A striking example of such risks was offered not long ago by UNSC
Resolution 1888 (2009) that dealt with sexual war crimes. The Resolution's
operative paragraphs are preceded by the UNSC "[r]eiterating its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, in
345. Because, under existing practice, explicitly punitive rhetoric is couched in preventive
terms, it is highly problematic to put this suggestion to an empirical test.
346. For a discussion about the expressive power of criminal law and punishment, in particular,
see generally Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
Am. U. L. REv. 1393 (1993); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591 (1996); Dan M. Kahan, What's Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REv. 2075
(2006); and Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001).
347. O'DONOVAN supra note 92, at 55.
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this connection, its commitment to continue to address the widespread impact
of armed conflict on civilians, including with regard to sexual violence. .. ."348
The first operative paragraph then proceeds to state that the UNSC
[r]eaffirms that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war
in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or
systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate
situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international
peace and security . .. 349
Other paragraphs of the decision speak to the need to fight impunity and
bring perpetrators to justice.350 The wrong committed against the victims,
however, remains largely implicit; the focus of the decision remains on sexual
violence not as an inherent evil against its victims, but as an impediment to
peace.
V. CONCLUSION
In the 1760s, Blackstone defined war as "an appeal to the God of Hosts,
to punish such infractions of public faith as are committed by one independent
people against another; neither State having any superior jurisdiction to resort
to upon earth for justice. "35 International law no longer relies on God to mete
out punishment, nor does it accept claims of punishment in the name of God as
a just cause for war. But international law did, for a time, recognize both
religious and secular conceptions of state punishment, within and outside of
wars, for breaches of international law. It has now ceased to do so. Instead, it
replaced punishment with prevention, and guilt with threat, as justifications for
any action against states.
States now enjoy a conceptual normative immunity, granted to them as
political entities. The culpability of states is neither a necessary nor sufficient
ground to mete out punishment; and any notion of state culpability itself is
unrecognized by international law. There are no "guilty states," only guilty
individuals or guilty regimes. The project of international criminal law has
channeled all explicit punitive urges to individuals, keeping the state protected
from punishment. States today may only be prevented, regulated, or compelled
to act. The fact that a host of permissible measures that may be inflicted under a
preventive paradigm often has the same practical effects as under a punishment
paradigm makes no difference to international law.
A strong motivating force behind the channeling of all international
punishment to individuals and away from states has been the promotion of
peace and security on the international stage. A preference for peace has been
correlated with a preference for prevention. Punishment, conversely, even if
necessary for justice, has been feared as exacerbating international conflict. But
it is unclear whether the elimination of state punishment is necessary or even
348. S.C. Res. 1888, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888, at 3 (Sept. 30, 2009) (emphasis omitted).
349. Id. 1, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
350. Id. 17, at 4.
351. ROBERT PHILLIMORE, 3 COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAw 50 (1857).
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useful for the promotion of either peace or security. Despite the conventional
international wisdom, and as has been shown in domestic law debates over
criminal law, prevention is not necessarily more benign than punishment. It is
simply more flexible, and flexibility might itself be a perilous thing when
sanctions and coercion are at stake: flexibility can avoid an underlying
agreement on whether the act feared is a transgression of the law, it can escape
due process expectations, and it is potentially more open-ended in its coercion.
At the same time, by requiring a demonstration of clear threat to others,
prevention risks paralyzing the international community from taking action
where the threat to others is marginal, but a crime is nonetheless committed.
All of these possible pragmatic effects of reliance on prevention
compound the costs of the elimination of a punitive paradigm to a commitment
to a rule of law or to international justice more generally; indeed, it is
somewhat ironic that the decline of the paradigm of punishment for
transgressions occurred at the same time that multilateral treaties, jus cogens or
erga omnes obligations have risen and spread, claiming a universal law for the
international community. In requiring coercive action to be framed as
preventive rather than punitive, the prevention paradigm allows the
international community to escape the underlying question whether certain acts
are in fact universally condemned.
Naturally, punishment has its own perils, of which the international
community is clearly aware. It is also demanding of all those things that
prevention allows us to avoid-impartial justice, due process guarantees,
agreement on what constitute proportionate sentencing-and which are hard to
secure in the international system. But in punishing under the guise of
preventing, these demands do not become nullified; they are simply ignored.
It may ultimately be the case that the shift from punishment to prevention
is purely rhetorical, and that there is no coercive action that can be justified
under one paradigm that cannot be easily justified under the other. Indeed, most
coercive action is taken after there is some tangible exhibition of transgression.
And yet, if this is true, the insistence on a paradigm of prevention and the
elimination of all punitive rhetoric from international documents is puzzling.
Moreover, as this Article suggests, rhetoric matters, both for pragmatic and
moral reasons; and it is possible that the insistence on a preventive paradigm
for all international coercive action shapes the international community's
pragmatic and moral stance on various issues without our full conscious
consideration of it.
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